Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 73

Issue 3

Article 9

Summer 6-1-2016

The Demise of Capital Clemency
Paul J. Larkin Jr.
The Heritage Foundation

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul J. Larkin Jr., The Demise of Capital Clemency, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1295 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol73/iss3/9
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The Demise of Capital Clemency
Paul J. Larkin, Jr. ∗
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ...................................................................1295
II. Capital Punishment and Clemency...............................1298
A. The History of American Capital Punishment .......1298
B. Post-Gregg Criticisms of the Clemency Process
in Capital Cases .......................................................1307
III. Capital Punishment, Clemency, and Innocence ...........1313
IV. Capital Punishment, Clemency, and Severity ..............1331
V. Conclusion ......................................................................1348
Appendix A.....................................................................1350
Appendix B.....................................................................1351
Appendix C.....................................................................1353
I. Introduction
Over the last four decades, numerous commentators have
criticized the institution of executive clemency. 1 Opponents of
* Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation; M.P.P., George
Washington University, 2010; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1980; B.A., Washington
& Lee University, 1977. I was one of the lawyers for the United States in Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). The views expressed in this article are the author’s
own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The
Heritage Foundation. John Malcolm, John-Michael Seibler, and Christina
Tacoronti offered valuable comments on an earlier version of this article. JohnMichael Seibler and Ryan Tactac provided excellent research assistance. Any
errors are mine.
1. See generally JEFFREY P. CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER
(2009); Albert W. Alschuler, Bill Clinton’s Parting Pardon Party, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1131 (2010); Margaret C. Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169 (2010); Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the
Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593 (2013). Such
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capital punishment have been particularly vocal. Their principal
complaint has been that, with a few isolated exceptions, 2 far too
many chief executives have granted condemned prisoners
clemency far too infrequently. 3 This is an unfortunate
criticism is not an entirely new phenomenon. See, e.g., James P. Goodrich, Use
and Abuse of the Power to Pardon, 11 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 334,
335 (1920–1921) (“Thoughtful persons fear that a maudlin sentimentality may go
too far in the direction of mercy and lay too little emphasis on the necessity of
certain and inflexible punishment for violated law.”).
2. Several governors have issued a mass clemency to all death row
prisoners. Three governors—Tony Anaya of New Mexico, Richard Celeste of Ohio,
and George Ryan of Illinois—commuted the sentence of every condemned
prisoner in their states just before leaving office. Two governors—Jon Corzine of
New Jersey and Pat Quinn of Illinois—commuted the death sentences of every
prisoner on death row just before signing separate bills repealing capital
punishment in their respective states. In 2015, Maryland Governor Martin
O’Malley commuted the death sentence of every death row inmate after the state
repealed capital punishment, but did not make that legislation retroactive. See
Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 259 (1990–1991) (noting the 1986 mass commutation
by New Mexico Governor Tony Anaya); Michael Heise, The Death of Death Row
Clemency and the Evolving Politics of Unequal Grace, 66 ALA. L. REV. 949, 956,
980 (2015) [hereinafter Heise, Unequal Grace] (explaining how Illinois Governor
George Ryan removed inmates from death row because of concerns about the
possibility of executing innocent prisoners); Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On
Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of
Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2004) (calling George Ryan’s mass
commutation “the single sharpest blow to capital punishment since the United
States Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in 1972”); DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency (last visited Sept. 6, 2016)
(tracking clemency statistics by state) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Critics have faulted those exercises of the clemency power too. See
generally David A. Wallace, Dead Men Walking—An Abuse of Executive Clemency
Power in Illinois, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 379 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1123, 1124 (2012) (“[B]etween 1923 and 1972 Texas executed 461 people . . .
[and] . . . commuted 100 capital sentences . . . . Since 1976, when the United
States reinstated the death penalty, Texas has executed 477 people . . . [and]
granted clemency [twice] . . . .”) (footnotes omitted). See generally Michael A.G.
Korengold et al., And Justice for Few: The Collapse of the Capital Clemency
System in the United States, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 349 (1996); Victoria J. Palacios,
Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court’s Reliance on Commutation to Ensure
Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1996); Michael L. Radelet
& Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U.
RICH. L. REV. 289 (1993); Stephen E. Silverman, Note, There is Nothing Certain
Like Death in Texas: State Executive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death
Row Inmates’ Last Appeals, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 375 (1995). There are three forms of
clemency in capital cases: (1) a reprieve, which merely postpones execution; (2) a
commutation, which can reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment, with or

THE DEMISE OF CAPITAL CLEMENCY

1297

development—critics argue—one due entirely to the politicization
of criminal justice, particularly on the subject of capital
punishment. 4 Governors are unwilling to risk their political future
by commuting the sentences of condemned prisoners absent proof
of their innocence—the argument goes—because they anticipate
receiving few political benefits from extending mercy to killers, 5
and they fear being tarred with the label “soft on crime” in their
next campaign. 6 Perhaps what frightens governors most of all—
critics maintain—is the prospect that commuting a condemned
prisoner’s sentence could ultimately lead to his release and his
commission of new, horrific, but preventable, crimes. 7
without the possibility of parole, or a lesser sentence; and (3) a pardon, which
releases an offender from custody. See Elkan Abramotiz & David Paget, Executive
Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 137–38 (1964) (describing
executive clemency).
4. See Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due
Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 280–
81 (1994) (examining the political pressures associated with death penalty
decisions).
5. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE
LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 190 (2015) (“As Senator James Webb (D-VA)
once said at a conference on prisoner reentry, ‘The question is about fear. And I
think it pervades the political process.’”).
6. For example, in 1992 then-Governor Bill Clinton suspended his
presidential campaign to return to Arkansas for the execution of Ricky Rector, a
brain damaged prisoner who put his last meal dessert aside “for later,” so that he
could not be labeled “soft on crime”—a label that hurt Michael Dukakis’
presidential efforts four years earlier. See James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier,
May God—or the Governor—Have Mercy: Executive Clemency and Executions in
Modern Death-Penalty Systems, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 200, 200–01 (2000) (noting that
Rector would occasionally lapse into “crazed fits of barking and howling”);
Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105, 105 (“Bill
Clinton had to prove that he was a Democrat who could handle mainstream
priorities—including the death penalty.”). See generally Cathleen Burnett, The
Failed Failsafe: The Politics of Executive Clemency, 8 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 191
(2003); Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive
Justice: Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures,
25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413, 436, 444–45 (1999); Paul J.
Larkin, Jr., Revitalizing the Clemency Process, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 833,
874–80 (2016) [hereinafter Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency] (describing political
influences in clemency); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and
Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 731–35, 756–63 (2013)
(describing political influences in criminal justice policy generally).
7. That concern is not hypothetical. See, e.g., EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN,
PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVERNOR’S EDUCATION ON DEATH ROW iii, 90–
115 (1989) (describing the case of Edward Wein, a multiple rapist and murderer,
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This Article maintains that these criticisms are unfounded or
overstated. Part II describes the new procedures that the federal
and state governments have instituted to satisfy constitutional
capital sentencing requirements that did not exist when governors
regularly granted condemned prisoners clemency. Part II also
identifies some of the criticisms leveled against the use of clemency
in capital cases over the last forty years. Part III addresses the
question of whether governors should use their clemency power
whenever there is a risk that a condemned prisoner is innocent.
Part III concludes that a governor should not merely grant
clemency, but also issue a pardon to any offender who proves to be
innocent of his crime, but notes that the instances in which that
scenario might occur are few and far between. Part IV deals with
the argument that chief executives have failed to sift out those
cases in which death is an inappropriate penalty for a particular
offender. It concludes that, given the numerous opportunities for
the jury and state courts to spare those offenders, there is far less
need today for a governor to second-guess the unanimous view of
the local community and state judiciary that a death sentence is
the appropriate punishment. Finally, critics do not address the
horrific facts of some capital cases—facts that can signify that
death is the appropriate penalty.
II. Capital Punishment and Clemency
A. The History of American Capital Punishment
Capital punishment for heinous crimes and executive
clemency for condemned prisoners have co-existed throughout the
who raped and killed one woman and attempted to murder another, crimes made
possible only because California Governor Pat Brown had commuted his original
death sentence); Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of
Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 823 (2015) (noting that former Arkansas
Governor Mike Huckabee commuted an offender’s sentence, the inmate was later
released, and afterwards he murdered four police officers); Jailhouse Nation,
ECONOMIST (June 20, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21654619how-make-americas-penal-system-less-punitive-and-more-effective-jailhousenation (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) (“One reason Michael Dukakis was never
president was that a murderer called Willie Horton, who was released on furlough
while Mr. Dukakis was governor of Massachusetts, took the opportunity to rape
someone.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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history of Western Civilization. 8 The two institutions have always
co-existed in an opposing manner: one symbolizing society’s
abhorrence of certain conduct, 9 and the other signaling that
sometimes mercy can adequately promote society’s criminal justice
needs. 10 Capital punishment has been defended on the ground that
it serves several different purposes of punishment: retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and education. 11 Executive clemency
for condemned prisoners has been justified on the ground that it
serves purposes that the criminal justice system cannot satisfy. 12
8. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197–98 (1971)
(explaining that death was the mandatory penalty for felonies at common law),
reh’g granted and judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio,
408 U.S. 941 (1972); Genesis 4:8–16 (telling how after Cain murdered Abel, God
granted Cain the Mark of Cain so that he would not be killed by others); Exodus
21:12 (“Whoever strikes a man so that he dies shall be put to death.”); Matthew
27:20 (saying Pontius Pilate pardoned Barabbas instead of Jesus); 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201 (noting that, at common law, death was the
punishment for murder), id. at *397–440 (discussing the crown’s authority to
grant clemency); CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, FORGIVENESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLORATION xviii n.10 (2007) (explaining that Julius Caesar granted clemency
to some conquered nations); John Milton, Paradise Lost, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN
MILTON bk. X 307 (F. Patterson ed., 1931) (“[T]emper . . . Justice with
Mercie . . . .”). See generally NAOMI D. HURNAND, THE KING’S PARDON FOR
HOMICIDE BEFORE AD 1307 (1970).
9. In Gregg v. Georgia, the lead opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart
concluded that “the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate
sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community’s belief that certain
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
response may be the penalty of death.” 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976). Justice Stewart
reached that conclusion in the context of justifying capital punishment on
retributive grounds. Id. The rationale is that, in executing an offender,
particularly for some of the hideous crimes that condemned prisoners have
committed, see infra text accompanying notes 146–156 and Appendix C, the
sovereign demarks certain conduct as being so far beyond the limits of even
“ordinary” homicide that it must signify its abhorrence by declaring that the
offender is no longer fit to live in society. Id.
10. See, e.g., Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927)
A pardon . . . is not a private act of grace from an individual happening
to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When
granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the
public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the
judgment fixed.
11. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, 175 n.20 (describing the purposes of capital
punishment as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation).
12. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (calling clemency a
“relief mechanism” for the fallible justice system).
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It acts as an external “fail safe” 13 for mistaken convictions and
unduly severe punishments; it allows the chief executive discretion
to override the decisions of prosecutors, juries, and judges, and to
impose his own stamp on the criminal justice system; and it allows
mercy to trump justice even when a conviction and sentence cannot
be deemed flawed or unduly harsh. 14 Both practices have been in
existence in the United States from the nation’s earliest days. 15
At common law, death was the mandatory punishment for
every felony. 16 The American colonies, which inherited the
13. Id. (quoting KATHLEEN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 131 (1989)).
14. See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (“Executive
clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the
operation or enforcement of the criminal law.”); In re Flournoy, 1 Ga. 606, 607
(1846) (“[A pardon] proceeds upon the idea of innocence . . . And as all good
governments are founded upon essential equity, the sovereign authority will not
permit, so far as it can be prevented consistently with the maintenance of general
laws, injustice to be done.”); Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 6, at 848–
50 (“Presidents have extended offenders [clemency] for a host of reasons: as
correction for an errant conviction or unduly severe punishment, . . . [because] a
lesser punishment better serves the nation’s interests, . . . [to] demonstrate[] that
he oversees the operation of the criminal law, or simply as an act of grace.”);
Williams W. Smithers, Nature and Limits of the Pardoning Power, 1 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 549 (1911) (surveying the justifications for clemency);
Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and
the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 89 (2002) (“[P]ardons may be
issued when justice would otherwise not be served either because the sentence
was too harsh or because the person was wrongly convicted.”). Presidents have
also used their clemency power in matters of state. See Larkin, Revitalizing
Clemency, supra note 6, at 850–51, 850 n.55.
15. See, e.g., Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1, 3, 8–10, 14, 23, 1 Stat. 112 (1790)
(imposing mandatory capital punishment for various crimes, such as: treason;
murder within exclusive federal jurisdiction; murder or robbery on the high seas;
piracy; being an accomplice to murder, robbery, or piracy on the high seas;
counterfeiting; and using force to help a condemned prisoner escape); United
States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833) (“As this [clemency] power had been
exercised, from time immemorial, by the executive of that nation whose language
is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance;
we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon . . . .”);
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 53–62 (2002)
(describing capital punishment and clemency in seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury America); CROUCH, supra note 1, at 12–19 (describing the Framers’
opinions regarding clemency); HUGH F. RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
THE GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 105–10, 121–22, 171 (1965)
(describing capital punishment and clemency in seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury Virginia).
16. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197–98 (1971), reh’g granted and
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common law, 17 also used capital punishment for various crimes,
such as treason, murder, piracy, arson, robbery, and burglary. 18
Juries, however, disliked seeing a mandatory death sentence in
cases where the offender did not deserve to die and would refuse to
convict a defendant if doing so would send him to the gallows. 19
The federal and state governments responded to those decisions
over time by progressively modifying their criminal laws in
different ways.
The first step was to redefine the crime of capital murder. Late
in the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania divided capital murder
into two degrees, with death as the penalty only for first-degree
murder, then classified as a “willful, deliberate and premeditated”
homicide. 20 Other states followed in Pennsylvania’s wake to limit
a mandatory death penalty to the most heinous offenses. 21 That
reform, however, did not work. Denied the discretion to impose a
punishment less than death for even a newly-limited category of
capital murders, juries “on occasion took the law into their own
hands” 22 and refused to convict clearly guilty defendants who, in
the jury’s view, did not deserve to be executed. 23
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941
(1972); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *201.
17. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 38–39).
18. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976); BANNER, supra
note 15, at 54.
19. See generally Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289; McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198–99;
Robert E. Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L.
REV. 1099, 1102 (1953).
20. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198 (quoting Pa. Laws 1794, ch. 1777); Edwin R.
Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA.
L. REV. 759 (1949); Philip English Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital
Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U. L. REV. 32 (1974).
21. See, e.g., McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198 (“[Pennsylvania’s] reform was soon
copied by Virginia and thereafter by many other states.”); Herbert Wechsler &
Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 707–
09 (1937) (discussing statutory reforms in the United States).
22. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971).
23. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289–90 (1976) (examining the “not
infrequent refusal of juries to convict murderers”); McGautha, 402 U.S. at 198
(describing that history as a “rebellion” against mandatory capital sentences);
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(explaining that the nineteenth century movement against the death penalty was
impelled in part by the “practical consideration that jurors were reluctant to bring
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Conceding defeat, the federal government and the states’ next
response was to grant juries complete discretion whether to impose
the death penalty in murder cases. 24 By 1963, discretionary capital
sentencing in murder cases was universal. 25 Some groups, such as
the American Law Institute (ALI), recommended that juries be
given standards to guide their discretion, 26 but standardless
discretion remained the typical sentencing format in capital cases.
In fact, in 1971 in McGautha v. California, 27 the Supreme Court of
the United States expressly rejected a due process challenge to
standardless jury sentencing. 28 The Court concluded that, given
the countless factors potentially relevant in the myriad of cases,
any guidance would end up being “either meaningless ‘boiler-plate’
or a statement of the obvious that no jury would need.” 29 The Court
in verdicts which inevitably called for its infliction”).
24. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291 (1976) (noting
that Tennessee was the first state to do so in 1838); Winston v. United States, 172
U.S. 303, 313 (1899) (ruling that a federal law had “committed the whole matter”
of the death penalty’s “exercise to the judgment and conscience of the jury”).
25. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291–92.
26. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962) (enumerating aggravating
and mitigating circumstances that capital sentencing juries should consider).
27. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh’g granted and judgment vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
28. See id. at 207 (finding “it quite impossible to say that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital
cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution”).
29. Id. at 208. The Court went on to criticize such guidance in depth:
It is apparent that such criteria do not purport to provide more than
the most minimal control over the sentencing authority’s exercise of
discretion. They do not purport to give an exhaustive list of the relevant
considerations or the way in which they may be affected by the
presence or absence of other circumstances. They do not even
undertake to exclude constitutionally impermissible considerations.
And, of course, they provide no protection against the jury determined
to decide on whimsy or caprice. In short, they do no more than suggest
some subjects for the jury to consider during its deliberations, and they
bear witness to the intractable nature of the problem of ‘standards’
which the history of capital punishment has from the beginning
reflected. Thus, they indeed caution against this Court’s undertaking
to establish such standards itself, or to pronounce at large that
standards in this realm are constitutionally required. In light of
history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge,
we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled
discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital
cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. The States are
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also saw no need to mandate a two-stage trial process so that a
defendant who declined to testify at trial could plead for his life at
a separate proceeding devoted to sentencing. 30
All that changed only one year later. Relying now on the
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 31 the
Supreme Court did a complete about-face in Furman v. Georgia. 32
By a five-to-four vote, the Court in Furman held unconstitutional
the identical discretionary sentencing laws that it had sustained
in McGautha. 33 Two members of the Court—Justices William
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall—concluded that the death
penalty could never serve as the punishment for any crime,
entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly awesome
responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due
regard for the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety
of factors, many of which will have been suggested by the evidence or
by the arguments of defense counsel. For a court to attempt to catalog
the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than
expand the scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would
ever be really complete.
Id. 207–08 (footnotes omitted).
30. Id. at 210–20.
31. The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Nothing in the Court’s prior capital punishment
decisions gave any hint that the death penalty might violate the Eighth
Amendment. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971) (“[W]e
find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of
the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to
anything in the [C]onstitution.”); id. at 226 (Black, J., concurring) (“The Eighth
Amendment forbids ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ In my view, these words
cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in common
use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors
came at the time the Amendment was adopted.”); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (holding that carrying out a second attempt at
execution after first attempt was unsuccessful was not unconstitutional); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding electrocution as a permissible method
of execution); id. at 447 (“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the [C]onstitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous[,] something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”); Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134–35 (1878) (“Cruel and unusual punishments are
forbidden by the Constitution, but . . . the punishment of shooting as a mode of
executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree is not
included in that category, within the meaning of the [E]ighth [A]mendment.”).
33. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40.
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regardless of the procedures used at sentencing. 34 Justice William
Douglas found that discretionary sentencing schemes were
“pregnant with discrimination,” but he reserved judgment about
mandatory death penalties. 35 Justices Potter Stewart and Byron
White concurred in the judgment on narrower grounds. Justice
Stewart, because purely discretionary sentencing schemes had led
to arbitrariness; 36 Justice White, because the death penalty had
been imposed so infrequently that it no longer made any
measurable contribution to a legitimate purpose of punishment. 37
Four members of the Court—Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Justices Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist, and Harry Blackmun—
concluded that the death penalty was a constitutionally valid
punishment and that juries could be given discretion to decide
whom to condemn and whom to spare, as the Court had decided in
McGautha. 38
34. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (“Death is an
unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong probability that it
is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually total; and
there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than
the less severe punishment of imprisonment.”); id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“[T]he death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary
punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment.”).
35. See id. at 257–58 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment) (“Such
conceivably might be the fate of a mandatory death penalty, where equal or lesser
sentences were imposed on the elite, a harsher one on the minorities or members
of the lower castes. Whether a mandatory death penalty would otherwise be
constitutional is a question I do not reach.”) (citation omitted).
36. See id. at 309–10 (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the
same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”).
37. See id. at 313 (“[A]s the statutes before us are now administered, the
penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated
to be of substantial service to criminal justice.”).
38. Id. at 375–82 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems fair to ask what
factors have changed that capital punishment should now be ‘cruel’ in the
constitutional sense as it has not been in the past.”); id. at 405–11 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that, despite his “distaste, antipathy, and, indeed,
abhorrence, for the death penalty” the decision “should not be taken over by the
judiciary in the modern guise of an Eighth Amendment issue”); id. at 421–65
(Powell, J., dissenting) (“It is important to keep in focus the enormity of the step
undertaken by the court today. Not only does it invalidate hundreds of state and
federal laws, it deprives those jurisdictions of the power to legislate with respect
to capital punishment in the future . . . .”); id. at 465–70 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s judgments today strike down a penalty that our Nation’s
legislators have thought necessary since our country was founded.”).
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The federal and state governments believed that capital
punishment remained a worthwhile and permissible sanction as
long as the jury’s discretion was guided or eliminated. 39 Trying yet
again, Congress and state legislatures each chose one of two
different responses. 40 One approach was to adopt discretionary
sentencing schemes like the one recommended by the ALI. 41
Georgia, for example, went that route and adopted a two-stage
process, with a separate sentencing phase at which the judge
would offer the jury guidance in making its life-or-death decision. 42
The other approach was to return to mandatory capital
sentencing—North Carolina and some other states followed that
path. 43 Either approach—Congress and state legislatures
believed—would avoid the risk of arbitrariness that had troubled
Justices Stewart and White. 44 That was important because adding
either justice’s vote to the four Furman dissenters would create a
majority to sustain capital punishment.
Four years later, the Court revisited this issue in Gregg v.
Georgia 45 and rejected the claim that the death penalty was
invariably a “cruel and unusual punishment” forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment. 46 Gregg upheld the State’s new
guided-discretion capital sentencing procedure, based on the ALI’s
proposed model sentencing law—the same approach that the Court
had labeled “meaningless ‘boiler-plate’” in McGautha. 47 By
39. Jeffrey T. Heintz, Legislative Response to Furman v. Georgia—Ohio
Restores the Death Penalty, 8 AKRON L. REV. 149, 154 (1974) (“Predictably, the
state legislatures began expressing the intention to reinstitute the death penalty
soon after the Furman decision was announced.”).
40. See id. (stating that legislatures had a choice between instituting a
mandatory death penalty for certain offenses or creating “workable standards”).
41. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962) (identifying aggravating and
mitigating circumstances relevant to a jury’s capital sentencing decision).
42. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 160–68 (1976) (describing Georgia’s
new sentencing procedures).
43. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976) (discussing
North Carolina’s mandatory capital sentencing law).
44. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 167 (explaining how Georgia’s sentencing
procedures specifically included tests to guard against arbitrariness).
45. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
46. Id. at 168–87.
47. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971), reh’g granted and
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941
(1972).
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contrast, in a companion case to Gregg, Woodson v. North
Carolina, 48 the Court ruled that a mandatory death penalty was
now not just an unsatisfactory way to deal with capital crimes, but
also an unconstitutional approach, rejected by years of experience
with juries. 49 Gregg brought to a close the decade-long period in
which a small number of lawyers working at the NAACP Legal
Defense & Educational Fund had effectively persuaded the federal
courts to impose a moratorium on the use of capital punishment
while their nationwide campaign to have the death penalty
declared unconstitutional wended its way through the courts. 50
48. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
49. See id. at 285–305 (“[O]ne of the most significant developments in our
society’s treatment of capital punishment has been the rejection of the commonlaw practice of inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every person convicted
of a specified offense.”).
50. For an insider’s account of that effort, see generally MICHAEL MELTSNER,
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
There were second-, third-, and fourth-order claims that could still be litigated
after Gregg, such as the following: (1) the death penalty discriminated against
black defendants (because they were sentenced to death at a disproportionately
high rate) or members of the black community (because murderers of black
victims were sentenced to death at a disproportionately low rate); (2) the “death
qualification” of jurors—that is, the exclusion at the guilt stage of jurors who
would not consider imposing the death penalty at the sentencing stage—violated
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury taken from a “fair cross-section”
of the community; (3) individual capital sentencing schemes were
unconstitutional under Gregg; (4) executing some categories of defendants—for
example, the mentally incompetent, juveniles—was unconstitutional; and (5) old
criminal procedure doctrines, such as the permissible use of an “Allen charge,” a
supplemental jury instruction telling a potentially deadlocked panel to continue
deliberating to reach a verdict, see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896),
should be reconsidered and forbidden in capital cases. Over time, the Supreme
Court accepted some of those claims and rejected the others. See, e.g., Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (ruling that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause prohibits the execution of an offender who was a juvenile at
the time of the crime); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (same, a
mentally retarded offender); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988)
(rejecting challenge to use of an Allen charge in a capital case); Sumner v.
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987) (ruling that a mandatory sentence of death cannot
be imposed on a prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319–20 (1987) (rejecting
claims of discriminatory application of the death penalty); Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 416–18 (1986) (ruling that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause prohibits the execution of an offender incompetent at the time of his
execution even if he was found competent to stand trial and sane at the time of
the crime); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986) (rejecting the argument
that the dismissal at the guilt stage of jurors who would not consider the death
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B. Post-Gregg Criticisms of the Clemency Process in Capital Cases
Following Gregg, there was not only a material increase in the
number of offenders sentenced to death, but also an even greater
decline in the number of offenders whose death sentences were
commuted. 51 That was a new development. Until 1976, governors
had commuted capital sentences with some degree of frequency
throughout the twentieth century. 52 The post-Gregg decrease in
penalty violates the Sixth Amendment Jury Trial Clause); Roberts v. Louisiana,
431 U.S. 633, 638 (1977) (ruling that a mandatory sentence of death cannot be
imposed on an offender for the first-degree murder of a police officer).
51. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Rethinking the Timing of Capital
Clemency, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) (describing how, excluding mass
commutations, governors and pardon boards commuted only sixty-six death
sentences from 1976–2013); Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical
Analysis of Clemency and Its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 241 (2003) [hereinafter
Heise, Numbers] (explaining that, despite an increase in the number of death
sentences, there has been “a decrease in the number of defendants removed from
death row through clemency”); Mary-Beth Moylan & Linda E. Carter, Clemency
in California Capital Cases, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 37, 45–46 (2009) (tracking
the decrease in commutations in California); William Alex Pridemore, An
Empirical Examination of Commutations and Executions in Post-Furman Capital
Cases, 17 JUST. Q. 159, 161 fig.1 (2000) (charting the number of executions
compared to commutations); Sarat & Hussain, supra note 2, at 1310 (noting the
“dramatic shift” during the 1990s in the diminishing number of inmates granted
clemency).
52. Different commentators have offered different statistics or calculations.
One has said that, from 1900 to 1968, there were more than 700 commutations,
but from 1976 to 2013, aside from mass commutations that cleared out death row,
governors commuted the death sentences of only sixty-six people, many of which
occurred when a governor was leaving office. Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 6, 50.
Another commentator calculated that, from 1960 to 1970, the ratio of executions
to commutations was 5:4, while from 1976 to 1996 the ratio decreased to 5:1.
Korengold et al., supra note 3, at 357; see also BANNER, supra note 15, at 291 (“For
centuries governors commuted death sentences in significant numbers. That
pattern continued for the first two-thirds of the twentieth century. Florida
commuted nearly a quarter of its death sentences between 1924 and 1966. North
Carolina commuted more than a third between 1909 and 1954.”); JULIUS GOEBEL,
JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIA NEW YORK 227 n.17,
757–59 (1970) (“In general, the pardon power seems to have been exercised not
ungenerously . . . .”); GOTTSCHALK, supra note 5, at 186 (showing the number of
pardons by president); Bedau, supra note 2, at 262–66 & tbls.1 & 2 (analyzing the
number of death sentences and commutations from 1960–1988 and 1900–1985).
For a discussion of the standards used and reasons given by governors, see id. at
260–61 (identifying nine specific reasons); David Paget, Note, Executive Clemency
in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 159–77 (1964) (examining various
standards governors have applied to reach their decision).
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the number of commutations, coupled with an increase in juries’
decisions to impose the death penalty, meant that a greater
number of condemned prisoners faced the prospect of crossing the
River Styx.
Some commentators have bemoaned the drop-off in the
number of commutations in capital cases. 53 Some critics have
argued that the decline is troublesome in its own right, but capital
punishment opponents go further, claiming that the figures
disguise a deeper problem: namely, that governors have
abandoned their responsibility to ensure that justice is done in
each condemned prisoner’s case. 54 Fearing the electorate’s political
wrath, governors have refused to commute death sentences,
particularly in election years. 55 In fact, the argument goes, some
governors have allowed prisoners to be executed even though their
trials were marred by fundamental irregularities, their cases cried
out for leniency, or there was a serious doubt as to their guilt. 56
53. See generally supra note 3; cf. Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 6, 54–55
(criticizing the practice of delaying clemency consideration until after a prisoner
has exhausted all avenues of judicial relief).
54. See, e.g., Korengold et al., supra note 3, at 350 (“The decline in clemency
grants arguably reflects an abdication by state executives of their traditional role
in the capital system.”).
55. See, e.g., Laura M. Argys & H. Naci Mocan, Who Shall Live and Who
Shall Die? An Analysis of Prisoners on Death Row in the United States, 33 J.
LEGAL STUD. 255, 280 (2004) (“We find that if an inmate’s stay on death row ends
at a point in time where the governor is a lame duck, the probability of
commutation increases significantly.”); Burnett, supra note 6, at 198, 200
(naming specific instances of political backlash to grants of clemency);
Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 4 (“In large part, the decline of clemency can be
attributed to tough-on-crime politics.”); Jeffrey D. Kubik & John R. Moran, Lethal
Elections: Gubernatorial Politics and the Timing of Elections, 46 J.L. & ECON. 1,
3 (2003) (“We find that the occurrence of a gubernatorial election increases the
probability of state execution by approximately 25 percent.”); Pridemore, supra
note 51, at 172, 176, 180 (concluding in a post-Gregg study that governors are less
likely to commute death sentences in election years than in off years). Governors
themselves have admitted that political considerations entered into their
clemency decisions. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 7, at iii, 90–115 (explaining the
decision to commute the sentence of Edward Wein, who afterward raped and
murdered a woman). But see Heise, Numbers, supra note 51, at 292–93
(concluding that there is no significant variation in cases where a governor is
retiring from office).
56. See, e.g., Burnett, supra note 6, at 200 (“Prisoners have been executed in
cases where appeals were still pending, where their attorneys missed filing issues
or filed a brief over the page limit, and where significant, new or withheld
evidence was yet to be evaluated by any trier of fact.”); Daniel T. Kobil, How to
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There is more. Because the clemency power has long been
deemed a prerogative of presidents and governors, 57 they have
defined their decision-making procedures largely on their own
without any legislative or judicial oversight. 58 The result is that,
Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 219, 219–20 (2003)
(describing George W. Bush’s denial of Karla Faye Tucker’s request for clemency
despite widespread support); Silverman, supra note 3, at 394, 398 (arguing the
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles’ refusal to hear “Gary Graham’s facially
convincing claim of innocence” is an example of how Texas has “in practice”
abolished clemency).
57. Prior to 1998, the Supreme Court had consistently ruled that, because
the clemency power was a prerogative of the chief executive, the Constitution did
not regulate its exercise. See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 414
(1983); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Schick v. Reed,
419 U.S. 256 (1974); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), abrogated on other
grounds by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307
(1856). In 1998, however, the Court created uncertainty in this regard by issuing
a fractured opinion in Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
The question in Woodard was whether the old rule directing the courts to
maintain a “hands off” posture toward clemency still applied to condemned
prisoners despite the development of new procedural rights for convicted
offenders. Id. at 276. A plurality of four justices concluded that a condemned
prisoner has no right at clemency proceedings that is protected by the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 275, 279–85 (plurality opinion). But five justices concluded that
condemned offenders are entitled to minimal due process protections. Id. at 288–
89 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 291–95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Because one of those five justices (Justice John Paul Stevens) was in dissent,
however, there was no majority opinion on this issue. So far, the lower federal
courts have rejected post-Woodard attempts to regulate clemency proceedings
under the Due Process Clause as long as the governor does not use a decisionmaking process entirely devoid of any reason, such as flipping a coin to see who
should receive clemency. See generally Gissendaner v. Comm’r, Georgia Dep’t of
Corr., 794 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015); Winfield v. Steele, 755 F.3d 629 (8th Cir.
2014) (en banc); Wellons v. Comm’r, Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1268, 1269
(11th Cir. 2014); Anderson v. Davis, 279 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2002); Parker v. State
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2001); Workman v. Bell, 245
F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2001); Duvall v. Keating, 162 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1998); Davis
v. Scott, No. 8:14-CV-01676-T-27TBM, 2014 WL 3407473, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July
10, 2014); Schad v. Brewer, No. CV-13-01962-PHX-ROS, 2013 WL 5551668 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 4, 2013) aff’d, 732 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2013); Workman v. Summers, 136
F. Supp. 2d 896 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) aff’d, 8 F. App’x 371 (6th Cir. 2001).
58. See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280–81
(1998) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he heart of executive clemency . . . is to grant
clemency as a matter of grace, thus allowing the executive to consider a wide
range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing
determinations.”); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981)
(“[P]ardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of
courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.”);
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (“A fair reading of the history . . . of the
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critics say, governors have often used procedures that are so
manifestly unfair that they would be held unconstitutional if all
that were at stake were the denial of public welfare benefits. 59 Add
in the fact that there is no consensus on the standards that
governors should use when making clemency decisions, 60 and you
get a large number of cases in which it is impossible to explain why
clemency was granted or denied. Some argue that the result,
viewed at a nationwide level, is the same type of arbitrariness that
the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Furman. 61
language of that clause itself, and of the unbroken practice since 1790 compels
the conclusion that the power flows from the Constitution alone . . . and that it
cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress.”); Solesbee v.
Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950) (“Power of executive clemency . . . has
traditionally rested in governors or the President, although some of that power is
often delegated to agencies such as pardon or parole boards. Seldom, if ever, has
this power of executive clemency been subjected to review by the courts.”),
abrogated on other grounds by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871) (“To the executive alone is intrusted [sic]
the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.”).
59. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that due process
requires notice and an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker in order for the state to terminate welfare benefits); Deborah
Leavy, Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital
Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 910 (1981) (“The Supreme Court has set
high procedural standards to reduce the risk of informational error and provide
individualized sentencing in death penalty cases. Yet the effect . . . is negated
when the lack of procedural protection reintroduces those risks at the clemency
stage.”). For a detailed description of state clemency laws and processes, see
Paget, supra note 52, at 141–77.
60. See Daniel T. Kobil, Chance and the Constitution in Capital Clemency
Cases, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 567, 567 (2000) (describing clemency as a “largely
unprincipled, almost standardless component in our justice system”).
61. See id. (claiming clemency “has been exercised in an arbitrary fashion”
but also arguing that it has been underutilized). One remedy that critics propose
is to impose on governors the same procedural safeguards seen as a necessary
ingredient of the trial process in capital and non-capital cases alike, such as an
adversary proceeding at which the condemned prisoner is represented by
state-appointed counsel. Some commentators have even gone further and urged
states to create independent clemency boards staffed by career officials to prevent
politics from entering into clemency decisions. See Daniel T. Kobil, Due Process in
Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Clemency, 27 U.
RICH. L. REV. 201, 225 (1993) (“[C]onsiderations of fairness require that the
hearing should take place before an unbiased decision-maker.”); Silverman, supra
note 3, at 395–97 (outlining the procedure a hearing before an independent
clemency board would follow); Leavy, supra note 59, at 907 (calling for the use of
capital sentencing safeguards at clemency proceedings).
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Interestingly, one factor does not appear to play a role in
clemency decisions, a factor that has haunted the American
criminal justice system since Virginia was a colony: race. 62 Several
studies of post-Gregg executions over different periods since 1976
have concluded either that race was not a factor in governors’
decisions whether to commute a death sentence or that condemned
black prisoners are more likely than white death row inmates to
receive clemency. 63
By contrast, those studies found that men are more likely than
women to be sentenced to death and executed. 64 On its face, that
fact is not surprising, because men—particularly young men—
commit more crimes, including more violent crimes, than women. 65
In any event, that disparity does not by itself establish the
invidious discrimination necessary to establish an equal protection
62. See Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 22 (“[R]ace . . . has played a
comparatively minor role in successful commutations during the modern era.”).
63. See Argys & Mocan, supra note 55, at 272 tbl.2 (2004) (comparing
commutation rates among blacks, Hispanics, and other races); id. (noting that
with the exception of a condemned prisoner who received clemency because he
was black, race did not appear to play a role in clemency decisions); Matthew C.
Heise, The Geography of Mercy: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency for Death Row
Inmates, 39 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 3, 17 (2013) [hereinafter Heise, Geography]
(“[C]lemency rates for black and white defendants do not appear to differ, at least
at statistical levels.”); Heise, Numbers, supra note 51, at 281–84 (concluding that
there is no evidence that “racial or ethnic minorities on death row were any less
successful in obtaining clemency than their non-minority counterparts” which
“comports with prior empirical studies of clemency yet conflicts with widely-held
perceptions about the general influence of race in the death penalty context”);
Heise, Unequal Grace, supra note 2, at 973–75, 985 (“[W]hen it comes to clemency
decisions, any systemic racial tilt favors African-Americans.”); Pridemore, supra
note 51, at 175, 180 (“Neither the presence of at least one prior felony conviction
nor the offender’s race seems to play a role in the final disposition.”); John
Kraemer, Note, An Empirical Examination of the Factors Associated with the
Commutation of State Death Row Prisoners’ Sentences Between 1986 and 2005,
45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1410 (2008) (“Prisoners of black, Hispanic, or other
racial/ethnic heritage have slightly over twice the odds of commutation (OR=2.01)
compared to their white counterparts after removing the effect of other factors.
This association is highly unlikely to have been caused by chance (p=0.004).”).
64. Argys & Mocan, supra note 55, at 272 tbl.2; Heise, Geography, supra note
63, at 971–73, 985; Heise, Numbers, supra note 51, at 275–76 & tbl.5; Kraemer,
supra note 63, at 1408–10; Pridemore, supra note 51, at 176, 180.
65. MELISSA S. KEARNEY ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT, BROOKINGS, TEN
ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICY
MEMO 6 (May 2014); Heise, Unequal Grace, supra note 2, at 971; John Monahan,
A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners,
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 432 (2006).
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violation. 66 Men are more likely than women to commit predatory,
brutal, or horrific crimes. 67 Women who kill principally commit
crimes of passion within the domestic environment, perhaps
because they have been the victims of domestic violence. 68 In
addition, the criminal justice system has not unfairly targeted men
for disparate treatment based on statistically and morally
unjustified stereotypical views about their sex. 69 Under those
circumstances, the correlation some commentators have found
would not establish an equal protection violation.
*****
The next step is to determine whether those criticisms are
persuasive. It turns out that they are either unconvincing or
overstated. Indeed, parties seeking the abolition of capital
punishment do not give themselves sufficient credit for the
sizeable amount of progress they have made in that campaign. 70
The sentencing stage of capital prosecutions now eliminates
almost all of the people who would have received clemency in days
gone by. 71 The small number of commutations seen today is a
testament to that success and is an entirely logical result of the

66. See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
67. KEARNEY ET AL., supra note 65, at 6.
68. Heise, Numbers, supra note 51, at 274–78; Kraemer, supra note 63, at
1409; Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of PostConviction Relief and a Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 43, 43 (1998). But see Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 507 (1995)
(detailing how a woman arranged the contract killing of her husband so that she
could continue an affair).
69. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Managing Prisons by the Numbers: Using the
Good-Time Laws and Risk-Needs Assessments to Manage the Federal Prison
Population, 1 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 19 (2014) (“The evidence justifies
treating men differently from women.”).
70. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2016),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 8,
2016) (tracking the decrease in executions over the last ten years) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. See infra notes 151–156 and accompanying text (describing how the
criminal justice system now considers those mitigating factors that used to be
considered only for the purposes of clemency).

THE DEMISE OF CAPITAL CLEMENCY

1313

new capital sentencing rules adopted by the Supreme Court over
the last forty years. 72
III. Capital Punishment, Clemency, and Innocence
Critics of today’s clemency practices will argue that governors
have failed to ensure that no innocent person is executed. 73
According to those critics, given the horrific facts of some capital
cases, there is a unique risk that innocent defendants will be
convicted and executed in capital cases because the public will
demand that someone pay for those crimes. 74 That risk has always
existed, 75 critics say, but the proof is now far more persuasive.
Relying on the work of the Innocence Project as well as opinions by
Supreme Court Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer, capital
punishment opponents will contend that their claim is now
supported by credible scientific proof that the death penalty poses
an unacceptable likelihood of executing an innocent man. 76
Executive clemency will not stop this event from happening,
according to death penalty opponents, because governors, fearing
the wrath of angry voters—especially at the cusp of an election—
72. See infra text accompanying notes 146–150 (noting the various
situations where capital punishment is off the table).
73. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 92 (1987) (describing the
execution of Everett Applegate, a man denied clemency despite the governor’s
doubts regarding his guilt).
74. See, e.g., Frady, supra note 6, at 105 (characterizing the execution of
Rickey Rector as “a test in Arkansas of the lengths to which a society would
pursue the old urge to expiate one killing by performing another”).
75. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 73, at 72–75 (collecting early studies
alleging the execution of innocent parties). See generally BANNER, supra note 15,
at 121–22, 303–05; FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE DEATH
PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE (2008); EDWIN M. BORCHARD,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2012); BARRY SCHECK,
ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT
(2003).
76. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756–57 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (detailing cases where allegedly innocent people have been executed);
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 208–10 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (exploring
cases where innocent individuals might have been executed without a death
penalty moratorium).
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will refuse to grant clemency to condemned prisoners regardless of
their innocence whenever the public demands blood. 77
That criticism is more often leveled against the institution of
capital punishment itself rather than advanced as a fault in the
clemency process. 78 Moreover, the argument is as much designed
to undermine the resolve of death penalty supporters and scare
them into changing sides in the debate—or at least remaining
neutral—as it is used to persuade courts that the clemency process
is flawed. And that argument has the potential to silence capital
punishment’s supporters. It is, in fact, the most potent argument
that abolitionists can advance and could persuade a large number
of people. The execution-of-the-innocent claim forces people to
confront the greatest potential miscarriage of justice facing the
system. The assumptions are that no one wants to see an innocent
person executed and that few people are willing to support a
penalty carrying that risk whatever its other benefits may be. 79 At
least, that is what abolitionists believe.
It would be possible to side step this issue in an article
discussing the clemency process. The reason would be that the
question of whether the institution of capital punishment poses a
risk of executing an innocent defendant is materially different
from the question of whether the institution of executive clemency
adequately serves as the last line of protection for the innocent.
Clemency could be perfectly capable of protecting the vast number
of innocent parties who have not already been identified in the
judicial process even if there were a unique conviction-ofthe-innocent risk in capital cases. Of course, the clemency process
might be incapable of performing that function perfectly. No
criminal justice system could pass that test, however, 80 so we
should not demand perfection where it is not attainable. After all,
we demand only that the jury find a defendant guilty beyond a
77. See Burnett, supra note 6, at 205 (“The circumstantial evidence of
political influence leads me to convict the clemency process of failure to ensure
justice.”).
78. See id. at 205 (“‘Executions . . . [are] about justice not politics.”).
79. See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 3, at 377 (“It seems obvious beyond
explanation that it is wrong—in a moral and a legal sense—to put an innocent
person to death.”).
80. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (“It is an unalterable fact
that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is fallible.”).
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“reasonable doubt,” not “any doubt.” 81 Perfection, therefore, should
not be the standard. In any event, the question of whether
executive clemency can satisfactorily perform a goalkeeping
function should be analyzed separately from the question whether
capital punishment poses a unique risk of convicting the innocent.
That approach, however, is ultimately unsatisfactory because
it just kicks the can down the road. Whether the criminal justice
system will mistakenly execute an innocent party is hardly a new
problem. That risk has been around as long as the death penalty
has been a sentencing option. Executive clemency has promised to
function as the “fail safe” in the criminal justice system as long as
the death penalty has been an available punishment, which means
as long as the criminal justice system has been in operation. 82 If
that risk is not a significant one, there is little reason to believe
that executive clemency cannot identify the few cases where an
innocent person remains on death row after exhausting all of his
legal challenges to his conviction and sentence. Accordingly, it
makes sense to examine the execution-of-the-innocent risk in
federal and state cases to determine if executive clemency is an
adequate “fail safe.”
Start with the federal cases. The Justice Department will not
bring a capital case unless the Attorney General personally
approves it after review by the Capital Case Section of the
Criminal Division and the Attorney General’s Review Committee
on Capital Cases. 83 The federal government has executed only
81. See also, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 18–21 (1993) (upholding the
use of a jury instruction that defined reasonable doubt as “actual and substantial
doubt”); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398 (“A person when first charged with a crime is
entitled to a presumption of innocence, and may insist that his guilt be
established beyond a reasonable doubt.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 386 (1970)
(ruling that the reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally required).
82. See supra note 8 (exploring the long history of the death penalty and
clemency from case law, the Bible, and narrative works).
83. CAPITAL CASE SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/capital-case-section (last visited Sept. 9, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Trial and post-trial procedures are more
favorable to the defense in capital than noncapital cases. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 3005 (2012) (requiring the appointment of two defense lawyers in every capital
case, one of whom must be “learned in the law applicable to capital cases”); id.
§ 3592 (listing aggravating and mitigating factors for the jury to consider); id.
§ 3593 (requiring a hearing before the judge or jury on the appropriateness of the
death penalty); id. § 3595 (requiring appellate review in every case where a
prisoner was sentenced to death); id. § 3599 (providing counsel for indigent
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three offenders over the last fifty years, the best known one being
Timothy McVeigh, who was responsible for the Oklahoma City
bombing that killed 168 people and injured hundreds of others. 84
No one claims that McVeigh, or the other two executed offenders,
were innocent. Atop that, since the attacks on this nation on 9/11,
the federal government has carried out various operations in
foreign countries to kill parties like Osama Bin Laden 85 who were
responsible for the nearly three thousand murders that occurred
at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Shanksville,
Pennsylvania. No one claims that Bin Laden or the other terrorists
were innocent. The execution-of-the-innocent claim therefore does
not have much valence with regard to the federal government.
Turn to the state cases. Even there, the underlying risk of
executing an innocent party is insubstantial. There is no logical
reason to distinguish between capital and non-capital cases
regarding the risk of convicting an innocent man. 86 Most capital
cases involve a murder. 87 The same law enforcement officers
(ordinarily detectives), forensic examiners, prosecutors, judges,
and juries will be used in all homicide cases, whether or not the
government charges the defendant with capital murder and
prisoners for post-conviction proceedings in capital cases); id. § 3600 (offering
DNA testing); see also Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376–78 (1999)
(describing the operation of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3591–3599 (2012)).
84. See generally United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1999).
The other two are Juan Raul Garza and Louis Jones, Jr.; Jones v. United States,
527 U.S. 373 (1999); United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995); FACTS
ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY supra note 70.
85. See Helene Cooper, Obama Announces Killing of Osama bin Laden, N.Y.
TIMES (May 1, 2011, 11:29 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/binladen-dead-u-s-official-says/?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 9, 2016) (reporting that the
death of Osama bin Laden came as a result of a “‘targeted assault’” by U.S.
operatives) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
86. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[I]t is convictions, not punishments, that are unreliable.”).
87. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114, 1116, 1118–1121 (2012) (murder of
different parties or by a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment); id. § 3591(a)(2)
(authorizing death penalty for intentional homicide); 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2012)
(requiring proof of intent to kill in a drug case). In fact, there is some question
whether the death penalty is a constitutionally permissible sanction for any other
crime. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (ruling that the death
penalty cannot be imposed for the crime of the rape of an adult woman); Kennedy
v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (same, for a minor), opinion modified, 554 U.S.
945 (2008).
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whether or not the jury later returns a capital sentence. Moreover,
there are various procedural safeguards used only in capital cases
that minimize the risk that an innocent defendant will be convicted
and sentenced to death. 88 Courts are also far more likely to
critically examine the proof against an offender facing the gallows,
rather than imprisonment, regardless of the term imposed. 89
Finally, journalists in the national media seeking a Pulitzer Prize
would be hot on the trail of any condemned prisoner with any
remotely plausible claim of innocence. 90 In sum, it is unlikely that
the state governments will execute an innocent party.
Now look at this issue from a legislative perspective. Congress
and state assemblies may legitimately balance the risk of
executing an innocent offender against the risk that abolishing
capital punishment will lead to the murder of innocent parties. 91
After all, elected officials regularly make numerous decisions that
have life or death consequences; 92 whether to use capital
punishment is just one of them. As Professor Ron Allen and Amy
Shavell have explained:
Although it seems to have escaped the attention of the death
penalty debate, a common feature of social planning is that it
affects the incidence of death. Virtually all social policies and
decisions quite literally determine who will live and who will
88. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A
Response to the Bedau–Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 147–54 (1988)
(discussing state procedures).
89. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Researchers have
calculated that courts (or State Governors) are 130 times more likely to exonerate
where a capital murder, rather than a noncapital murder, is at issue.”).
90. See, e.g., Chronicle’s Falkenberg Wins Pulitzer for Commentary,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.chron.com/news/houstontexas/article/Chronicle-s-Falkenberg-wins-Pulitzer-for-6211676.php (last visited
Sept. 9, 2016) (describing how columnist Lisa Falkenberg’s reporting on the
innocence of a man on death row for ten years won her the Pulitzer Prize and led
to his release) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
91. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Amy Shavell, Further Reflections on the
Guillotine, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625 (2005); Markman & Cassell, supra
note 88, at 145–160; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment
Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703
(2005) [hereinafter Sunstein & Vermeule, Life-Life Tradeoffs]; Cass R. Sunstein
& Adrian Vermeule, Deterring Murder: A Reply, 58 STAN. L. REV. 847, 853 (2005)
[hereinafter Sunstein & Vermeule, Reply].
92. See Allen & Shavell, supra note 91, at 628 (using the example of
regulating road safety).
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die. Every year for half a century, between 25,000 and 40,000
people have died in vehicular accidents, many of whom are
innocent in every sense of the word. The number of deaths on
the roads is clearly quite sensitive to current regulation; faster
speed limits mean more deaths, safety devices on cars affect the
outcome of crashes, and so on. Merely permitting people on the
roads guarantees a slaughter, and the mere fact of innocent
deaths is not sufficient to put an end to the slaughter. But, is
that not because of the benefits that result? Maybe so, but that,
actually, is our point: explicit tradeoffs are made between
benefits and costs, including the costs of innocent deaths. 93

Consider a recent example of that tradeoff: the adoption of
medical or recreational marijuana initiatives. Federal and state
laws have outlawed the possession and distribution of marijuana
since the 1930s. 94 Recently, however, numerous states have
modified their criminal codes by adopting so-called “medical
marijuana programs”—viz., laws that permit marijuana to be used
for medical purposes. 95 A few states and the District of Columbia
have also decriminalized the possession of small quantities of
marijuana for personal use. 96 Supporters of those initiatives argue
93.
94.

Id. at 628 (footnote omitted).
See generally RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITBREAD II, THE
MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED
STATES 38–52 (1999).
95. See generally ALA. CODE § 13A-12-214.2 (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§§ 17.37.010–17.37.080 (West 2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2801 to 36-2819
(2014); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.5, 11362.7–11362.83 (West 2014);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1.5-106 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408
(2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, Ch. 49A (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329-121
to 329-128 (West 2014); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/1 (West 2014); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2014); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 333.26424(j) (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-301 (2014); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 453A.010 to 453A.240 (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 126-X:2 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. §24:6I (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31C-1
(2014); 2014 N.Y. Laws 90 (A.6357-E); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.300 (West 2014);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28.6 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4474b (2014);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.040 (West 2014). See also, e.g., William Vertes &
Sarah Barbantini, Caught in the Crossfire: The Dilemma of Marijuana
“Medicalization” for Health Care Providers, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 103, 105 n.17
(2012) (collecting ballot measures).
96. 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 3 (1.M.502) (West) (amending WASH. REV.
CODE § 69.50.4013 (2014)); AMENDMENT 64: USE AND REGULATION OF MARIJUANA
(2012) (amending COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)); see also TODD GARVEY & BRIAN
T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43034, STATE LEGALIZATION OF RECREATIONAL
MARIJUANA: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1–5 (Jan. 13, 2014) (summarizing the
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that the benefits from those exemptions outweigh any costs from
greater use of that drug. 97
A factor that is rarely discussed in that debate, however, is the
effect of medical or recreational marijuana use on highway
safety. 98 There is little doubt that enacting such programs
increases the risk of highway morbidity and mortality: the
National Institute of Medicine, the British Medical Association,
the World Health Organization, the federal officials in this nation
responsible for highway safety, and numerous researchers have
concluded that driving under the influence of marijuana poses a
serious risk of death or serious injury due to a vehicle crash. 99
Moreover, that risk is aggravated if a person consumes both
marijuana and alcohol because each drug amplifies the effect of the
other. 100 The result is this: adoption of medical and recreational
marijuana initiatives poses the risk of killing entirely innocent
parties, such as other motorists, passengers, or pedestrians. 101
Those people are no less innocent than the hypothetical individual
who is wrongfully convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to
death. If we are willing to leave to the public the authority to decide
whether the perceived benefits of medical or recreational
marijuana usage outweighs the costs of killing parties innocent of
a capital crime (any crime, in fact), we ought to be equally willing
Colorado and Washington initiatives); WILLIAM J. BENNETT & ROBERT A. WHITE,
GOING TO POT: WHY THE RUSH TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA IS HARMING AMERICA 9–10
(2015) (listing the states that have allowed marijuana for medicinal use). That
issue is likely to appear on the ballot in additional states in 2016.
97. For a discussion of the pros and cons of marijuana regulation, see
generally BENNETT & WHITE, supra note 96; BONNIE & WHITBREAD II, supra note
94; JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW (2d ed. 2016); ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR
HERESIES (2001); WAYNE HALL, CANNABIS USE AND DEPENDENCE: PUBLIC HEALTH
AND PUBLIC POLICY (2003); JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION
(1969); MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA: COSTS OF ABUSE, COSTS OF CONTROl
(1989); KEVIN A. SABET, REEFER SANITY: SEVEN GREAT MYTHS ABOUT MARIJUANA
(2013).
98. See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Medical or Recreational Marijuana and
Drugged Driving, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 453 (2015) (discussing this issue at length).
99. Id. at 476–78, nn.98–103.
100. Id. at 478–79, nn.104–108.
101. See id. at 477 (“[S]tudies justify the conclusion that marijuana use is
associated with an increased risk of motor-vehicle accidents, particularly ones
involving fatalities, due to its effects on psychomotor performance.”).
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to allow the public to decide whether the perceived benefits of
capital punishment outweigh the costs of killing the same type of
people.
It is no argument that legislators discount the risk of
executing an innocent party, or give that factor far less weight than
the risk of traffic accidents or other potentially fatal occurrences.
Any legislator who believes that capital punishment serves
legitimate purposes has an incentive to eliminate any
execution-of-the-innocent risk because that result would arm
abolitionists with their most treasured weapon. 102
When we ask whether elected officials have reasonably
analyzed the execution-of-the-innocent risk, we need to recognize
that eliminating capital punishment will surely lead to the murder
of innocent parties. History proves that point. Murderers have
been released or escaped and committed the same crime again; 103
102. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 15, at 303–05 (discussing the political
ramifications of executing innocent people).
103. See, e.g., Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 418 (1991) (explaining how
Mu’Min, while on work release, absconded and murdered a woman); Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 139–41 (1987) (detailing how, while serving a life sentence
for murder, Tison, with the aid of his wife and two sons, escaped and murdered a
family of four—which included a two-year-old—with repeated shotgun blasts);
Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY:
SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 208 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G.
Cassell eds., 2004) (“In fact, the balance of risk tips decisively in favor of retailing
the death penalty. . . . If they are not executed, they will remain serious threats
to kill again—either inside prison walls or outside them following an escape or a
parole.”); Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1995) (stating “the simple fact is, people
sentenced to life in prison without parole, or even to a death sentence, do,
occasionally, get out and do it again” and listing several examples, including
“Robert Massie, who celebrated the California Supreme Court’s commutation of
his 1965 murder conviction by murdering again” (footnotes omitted)); Joshua
Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 518 (2005)
(noting that “the additional victims of the freed” include “[n]ine, killed by Kenneth
McDuff, who had been sentenced to die for child murder in Texas and then was
freed on parole after the death penalty laws at the time were overturned”); Joshua
K. Marquis, Truth and Consequences: The Penalty of Death, in Bedau & Cassell,
supra note 103, at 133–34 (noting that Kenneth McDuff, Richard Marquette, Jack
Henry Abbott, and Robert Lee Massie committed additional murders after being
paroled); Allen & Shavell, supra note 91, at 631 (“According to the Bureau of
Justice reports, 6.6% of released murderers in 1983 were arrested for murder
within three years of their release. Of the state prisoners released in 1994, 1.2%
of the 4,443 persons (or 53 individuals) who had served time for homicide were
rearrested for homicide.”); Sewell Chan, Mailer and the Murderer, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2007, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/12/mailer-and-the-
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others have committed additional murders while imprisoned. 104
Former U.S. District Court Judge, now Professor, Paul Cassell has
made that point well:
Perhaps the most straightforward argument for the death
penalty is that it saves innocent lives by preventing convicted
murderers from killing again. . . . Some sense of the risk here is
conveyed by the fact that of roughly 52,000 state prison inmates
serving time for murder, an estimated 810 had previously been
convicted of murder and had killed 821 persons following those
convictions. Executing each of those inmates after the first
murder conviction would have saved the lives of more than 800
persons. . . . In plain words, some innocent people will die if we
abolish the death penalty. 105

murderer/?_r=0 (last visited June 12, 2016) (relating how well-known author
Norman Mailer helped secure the parole of Jack Henry Abbot, who subsequently
committed another murder within weeks of his parole) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); supra notes 7 & 55 (discussing the case of
Edward Wein who was released and committed murder); infra Appendix A
(listing additional cases).
104. See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1993) (“Thomas Creech
has admitted to killing or participating in the killing of at least 26
people. . . . Creech’s most recent victim was David Dale Jensen, a fellow
inmate . . . . When he killed Jensen, Creech was already serving life sentences for
other first-degree murders.”); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67 (1987) (“In
1958, respondent Raymond Wallace Shuman was convicted . . . of first-degree
murder . . . [and] was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of
parole . . . . [W]hile serving his life sentence, Shuman was convicted of capital
murder for the killing of a fellow inmate.” (citations omitted)); State v. Smith, 781
S.W.2d 761, 769 (Mo. 1989) (while imprisoned for a “second degree murder
conviction for shooting an eighty-six-year-old woman while defendant was
attempting to break into her home,” Smith repeatedly stabbed another inmate,
killing him), judgment vacated and case remanded on other grounds, 495 U.S. 916
(1990), capital sentence reinstated on remand, 790 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1990); State
v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Mo. 1982) (noting that while serving a life
sentence for first degree murder, Bolder murdered another prison inmate);
Cassell, supra note 103, at 192 (“[T]hose serving a sentence of life without parole
(often offered as a substitute for capital punishment) have a ‘license to kill’
without the availability of the death penalty.”); Allen & Shavell, supra note 91, at
630–31, 639 (noting that a Lexis-Nexis search from 1999–2005 revealed more
than thirty instances of inmates committing murder); WILLIAM WELD & PAUL
CASSELL, REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE SENTENCING COMMISSION 28 (Feb. 13, 1987) (“At least five federal prison
officers have been killed since December 1982, and the inmates in at least three
of the incidents were already serving life sentences for murder.”).
105. Cassell, supra note 103, at 187–88.
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Imprisonment therefore cannot eliminate the risk of murder;
it merely limits the pool of possible victims from the general public
to (at best) guards, administrative personnel, and other prisoners.
Their lives matter too, and a legislature can legitimately decide not
to make them bear that risk.
It is also far from obvious that a legislature must assemble
proof that the death penalty has a marginally greater deterrent
value than life imprisonment (with or without the possibility of
parole) before it can impose that punishment for a crime. 106 There
106. Belief in the deterrent effect of punishment, including capital
punishment, has ancient origins. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS,
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 1 (1973) (“Belief in the
deterrent efficacy of penal sanctions is as old as the criminal law itself.” (quoting
Norval Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 627, 631 (1966)));
Morris, supra note 106, at 631 (“As Sir Arthur Goodhart wrote, if punishment
‘cannot deter then we might as well scrap the whole of our criminal law.’” (footnote
omitted)). That belief “has informed and does inform political, administrative, and
judicial policy to so great a degree that deterrence has been described as a
‘primary and essential postulate’ of almost all criminal law systems.” ZIMRING &
HAWKINS, supra note 106, at 1. Accompanying that postulate is “the alleged
truism that men fear death more than any other penalty, and that therefore it
must be a stronger deterrent than imprisonment.” H.L.A. Hart, Murder and the
Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 433,
458 (1957). Hart goes on to quote Victorian judge and criminal law historian
James Fitzjames Stephen:
No other punishment deters men so effectively from committing crimes
as the punishment of death. This is one of those propositions which it
is difficult to prove, simply because they are in themselves more
obvious than any proof can make them. It is possible to display
ingenuity in arguing against it, but that is all. The whole experience of
mankind is in the other direction. The threat of instant death is the
one to which resort has always been made when there was an absolute
necessity for producing some result. . . . No one goes to certain
inevitable death except by compulsion. Put the matter the other way.
Was there ever a criminal who, when sentenced to death and brought
out to die, would refuse the offer of a commutation of his sentence for
the severest secondary punishment? Surely not. Why is this? It can
only be because ‘All that a man has he will give for his life.’ Any
secondary punishment, however, terrible, there is hope; but death is
death; its terrors cannot be described more forcefully.
Id. at 458. Stephens’ argument is flawed in several respects, but it is important
to note the difference between the deterrent theory of punishment and modern
theories of physics, such as Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. The latter can predict
consequences with mathematical certainty and reliability. The former cannot
because it is more a moral justification for the state’s use of punishment than a
scientific explanation of how punishment works. The deterrent theory of
punishment is one of several justifications for the state’s decision to inflict pain
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is no freestanding principle that only effective legislation is
constitutional. 107 As far as the text of the Constitution is
on an offender for breaking the law. The raison d'être for that and all other
justifications is simply to distinguish that form of public violence from the private
ones that offenders inflict on the public.
[T]heories of punishment are not theories in any normal sense. They
are not, as scientific theories are, assertions or contentions as to what
is or is not the case; the atomic theory or kinetic theory of gasses is a
theory of this sort. On the contrary, those major positions concerning
punishment which are called deterrent or retributive or reformative
‘theories’ of punishment are moral claims as to what justified the
practice of punishment—claims as to why, morally, it should or may be
used.
Id. at 466–67. Demanding that capital punishment justify its constitutionality by
proving its marginal utility over life imprisonment as a deterrent therefore misses
the point. As explained below, reasonable people can disagree over the deterrent
effect of capital punishment. Under those circumstances, we allow the people to
select a governing theory of punishment through the democratic process. See infra
notes 119 & 125 (discussing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and that
whether deterrence is effective should be left to legislatures).
107. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984) (“[T]his
Act . . . may not achiev[e] its intended goals. When the legislature’s purpose is
legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical
debates over the wisdom of takings . . . are not to be carried out in the federal
courts.”); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671–72
(1981) (“[W]hether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not the
question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if . . . the . . . [state]
Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its
objective.”); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979) (“‘It makes no difference
that the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed by argument and opinion of
serious strength. It is not within the competency of the courts to arbitrate in such
contrariety.’” (quoting Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916))).
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., the Supreme Court addressed this
issue further in depth:
States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their
legislative judgments. Rather, those challenging the legislative
judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which
the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived
to be true by the governmental decision-maker . . . . Although parties
challenging legislation under the Equal Protection Clause may
introduce evidence supporting their claim that it is irrational, . . . they
cannot prevail so long as it is evident from all the considerations
presented to the legislature, and those of which we may take judicial
notice, that the question is at least debatable . . . . Where there was
evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting the
classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation
merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was
mistaken . . . . The Equal Protection Clause does not deny the State of
Minnesota the authority to ban one type of milk container conceded to
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concerned, the relevant provision is the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 108 The Framers took that
clause from the English Bill of Rights of 1689 109 and intended it to
prohibit only hideously painful punishments, ones that were not
authorized by law, and (perhaps) grossly disproportionate
penalties. 110 Neither that clause nor its lineal ancestor compels a
legislature to prove that a more severe punishment is a marginally
better deterrent than a less onerous penalty for it to be a lawful
sanction. 111
Moreover, it would have been unfathomable to the
Framers 112—or to anyone in the seventeenth and eighteenth
cause environmental problems, merely because another type, already
established in the market, is permitted to continue in use. Whether in
fact the Act will promote more environmentally desirable milk
packaging is not the question: the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied
by our conclusion that the Minnesota Legislature could rationally have
decided that its ban on plastic nonreturnable milk jugs might foster
greater use of environmentally desirable alternatives.
449 U.S. 456, 464, 466 (1981) (citations, footnote, and internal punctuation
omitted).
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). That fact
is significant because the Supreme Court has often made it clear that the courts
should consider only the specific constitutional provision addressing a particular
subject. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (noting
that substantive due process analysis is inappropriate if a party’s claim is
“covered by” a different constitutional provision); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
273 (1994) (“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source
of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior,
‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,”
must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 (1989))).
109. An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the
Succession of the Crown (The Bill of Rights), 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1688–89),
reprinted in 9 Statutes at Large 67 (Pickering 1764).
110. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967–73, 973 n.4, 979–85
(1991) (plurality opinion) (examining the history of the phrase “cruel and unusual
punishment”); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169–70, 170 n.17 (same); Anthony F. Granucci,
“Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. 839, 839–44 (1969) (same).
111. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175 (“We may not require the legislature to select
the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly
inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved.”).
112. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Fifth Amendment “explicitly contemplates” capital
punishment).
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centuries—for someone to claim that capital punishment can be a
lawful penalty only if it is a superior deterrent to crime than longterm imprisonment. That is true for a host of reasons: Every
common law felony was a capital crime; 113 the text of the
Constitution expressly recognized that capital punishment would
be imposed for some offenses; 114 the First Congress adopted several
capital crimes; 115 imprisonment did not exist as a punishment
until early in the eighteenth century; 116 and the first federal
prisons did not go into operation until the cusp of the twentieth
century. 117 To be sure, the Supreme Court has greatly expanded
the scope of that clause over the past sixty years, and occasionally
it has concluded that the death penalty is an excessive punishment
for certain crimes or offenders. 118 The Court, however, has left to
the political process the authority to decide the question whether
capital punishment simpliciter is an effective deterrent. 119 Neither
113. See supra note 16 (citing cases explaining the history of capital
punishment).
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury; . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” (emphasis added)).
115. See Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1, 3, 8–10, 14, 23, 1 Stat. 112 (1790)
(imposing mandatory capital punishment for treason, certain types of murder,
murder or robbery on the high seas, piracy, and other crimes).
116. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Parole: Corpse or Phoenix?, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 303,
308 (2013).
117. Id.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 146–149 (discussing various
categories of individuals and situations where the death penalty is automatically
not imposed).
119. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185–86 (1976)
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex
factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the
legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in
terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility . . . not
available to the courts . . . . Indeed, many of the post-Furman statutes
reflect just such a responsible effort to define those crimes and those
criminals for which capital punishment is most probably an effective
deterrent. “In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia
Legislature that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases
is clearly wrong. Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for
the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State,
the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility
as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing
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the text of nor the background to the Eighth Amendment justifies
abandoning that position.
In any event, the empirical question whether capital
punishment actually deters homicide to a greater extent than life
imprisonment—with or without the possibility of parole—has
vexed the criminal justice system for decades (as has the question
whether life imprisonment alone deters). Reasonable people have
lined up on both sides of the issue. Originally, participants in that
debate invoked logic, anecdotes, or competing psychological
theories to bolster their arguments. 120 Some economists and
sociologists have conducted regression analyses of the available
data and have concluded that capital punishment has a
measurable deterrent advantage over life imprisonment. 121 As
evidence, that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not
without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.
(citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 403–05 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting));
see also id. at 206 (White, J., concurring) (incorporating by reference Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 354–56 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
120. See generally ROYAL COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949–1953,
REPORT: PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND OF HER MAJESTY (Sept. 1953);
HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
(Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1967); supra note 106.
121. See generally DALE O. CLONINGER & ROBERTO MARCHESINI, EXECUTION
MORATORIUMS, COMMUTATIONS AND DETERRENCE: THE CASE OF ILLINOIS, Econ.
Working
Paper
Archive,
Working
Paper
No.
0507002
(2005),
mcadams.posc.mu.edu/blog/Illinois_study.pdf; Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto
Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33
APPLIED ECON. 569 (2001); Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Evidence from a “Judicial Experiment,”
44 ECON. INQUIRY 512 (2006); Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital
Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel
Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003); Isaac Ehrlich & Zhiqiang Liu, Sensitivity
Analysis of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Let’s Keep the Econ in Econometrics, 42 J.
L. & ECON. 455 (1999); Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some
Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977); Isaac
Ehrlich & John Gibbons, On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1977); Isaac
Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209 (1975); Isaac
Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death,
65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975); Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment and the
Deterrence Hypothesis: Some New Insights and Empirical Evidence, 30 E. ECON.
J. 237 (2004); H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row:
Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. &
ECON. 453, 453 (2003); David P. Phillips, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. J. SOC. 139 (1980);
Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment's
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Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have noted, “the
recent evidence of a deterrent effect from capital punishment
seems impressive, especially in light of its “‘apparent power and
unanimity.’” 122 Other scholars, however, doubt that conclusion. 123
Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203 (2005); Joanna M.
Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital
Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 308 (2004); Steven Stack, Publicized
Executions and Homicide, 1950–1980, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 532 (1987); James A.
Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent to Homicide? Some Time Series
Evidence, 5 J. BEHAV. ECON. 45 (1976); Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions,
Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004).
122. Sunstein & Vermeule, Life-Life Tradeoffs, supra note 91, at 713 (quoting
Robert Weisberg, The Death Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury
Behavior Under New Scrutiny, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 151, 159 (2005)).
Sunstein and Vermeule do note, however, that even the new studies do not
conclusively prove that capital punishment has a deterrent effect. See id.
But in studies of this kind, it is hard to control for confounding
variables, and reasonable doubts inevitably remain. Most broadly,
skeptics are likely to question the mechanisms by which capital
punishment is said to have a deterrent effect. In the skeptical view,
many murderers lack a clear sense of the likelihood and perhaps even
the existence of executions in their states; further problems for the
deterrence claim are introduced by the fact that capital punishment is
imposed infrequently and after long delays. Emphasizing the weakness
of the deterrent signal, Steven Levitt has suggested that “it is hard to
believe that fear of execution would be a driving force in a rational
criminal’s calculus in modern America.” And, of course, some criminals
do not act rationally: many murders are committed in a passionate
state that does not lend itself to an all-things-considered analysis on
the part of perpetrators.
(quoting Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four
Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 175
(2004)).
123. See generally William C. Bailey, Murder, Capital Punishment, and
Television: Execution Publicity and Homicide Rates, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 628 (1990);
William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder and Capital Punishment: A
Monthly Time-Series Analysis of Execution Publicity, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 722 (1989);
David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin
and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170
(1975); Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà
Vu All over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303 (2005); William J. Bowers &
Glenn L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital
Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses
and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV.
791 (2005); Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and
Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003); Peter Passell & J.B. Taylor, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 445
(1977); Peter Passell, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test,
28 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1975); Jon K. Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
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It could be that each side’s view of the evidence is colored by its
judgment about the morality of the death penalty. 124 At the end of
the day, the debate may prove only that reasonable people can
disagree over this issue, and we leave disputes over the efficacy of
government programs to be resolved in the legislatures and at the
ballot boxes. 125
Does that mean there will never be an instance in which newly
discovered evidence proves beyond any doubt that a condemned
prisoner is innocent? Of course not—people make mistakes, and
even serious mistakes can go unremedied despite numerous
opportunities for correction. 126 Unfortunately, the work of the
Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359 (1976); Ruth D. Peterson
& William C. Bailey, Felony Murder and Capital Punishment: An Examination of
the Deterrence Question, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 367 (1991); Sunstein & Vermeule, LifeLife Tradeoffs, supra note 122. See also Sunstein & Vermeule, Life-Life Tradeoffs,
supra note 91, at 711–14 (collecting authorities finding that capital punishment
has a deterrent effect); id. at 708–09 n.16 (collecting authorities criticizing the
deterrence studies); see also James Fox & Michael Radelet, Persistent Flaws in
Econometric Studies of the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, 23 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 29, 29–30, 29 n.3 (1989) (collecting criticisms of Ehrlich’s original study).
124. See BANNER, supra note 15, at 281 (“There was a raging methodological
disagreement [among economists] over how to pick the best variables [to measure
the deterrent effect of the death penalty], and a nagging suspicion that
researchers’ own attitudes toward capital punishment were subconsciously
influencing the forms of equations.”); Sunstein & Vermeule, Reply, supra note 91,
at 857 n.10 (“Those who oppose the death penalty on moral grounds often seem
entirely unwilling to consider apparent evidence of deterrence. . . . Those who
accept the death penalty on moral grounds often seem to accept the claim of
deterrence whether or not good evidence has been provided.”). Two conclusions
seem true in this regard: Indisputable proof of capital punishment’s greater
deterrent effect would never persuade death penalty opponents to abandon their
campaign against the death penalty, and equally persuasive proof of the lack of a
deterrent effect would not persuade capital punishment defenders to settle for a
lesser penalty. See Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 103, at 26 (“[T]he deterrence
argument is beside the point. Death penalty opponents never . . . concede they
would change their minds if they were somehow to learn that [it] does deter. At
the same time, people who support the death penalty do not care all that much if
it deters crime.”).
125. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185–86 (1976) (“The value of capital
punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of
which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility . . .
not available to the courts.”); see also supra note 119 (citing Gregg).
126. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (“[H]istory is replete with
examples of wrongfully convicted persons who have been pardoned in the wake of
after-discovered evidence establishing their innocence.”).
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Innocence Project proves that this scenario is true. Sixty-one
condemned inmates were released from prison from 1987 to 1999
alone. 127 Some of them were exonerated by DNA evidence; the rest,
because of the post-sentencing discovery of perjured testimony by
dishonest witnesses or law enforcement officers. 128
If such a case were to arise, should the governor exercise his
clemency authority? Of course he should. No governor should
knowingly send an innocent man to the gallows. That would be
tantamount to murder. It would, moreover, arm capital
punishment’s opponents with their most powerful argument for
abolition. 129 In any event, governors are not reluctant to consider
a condemned prisoner’s evidence of his innocence: doubts about a
condemned prisoner’s guilt have served since Gregg as the most
common reason why governors have commuted a death
sentence. 130
Ironically, the same DNA evidence that has been used to
establish the innocence of numerous wrongly convicted parties
reduces the likelihood that a state will execute an innocent man.
DNA proof will not be available in every capital case, but, where it
is available, it can powerfully exculpate or inculpate someone.
When used early in the investigation or charging process, it can
eliminate suspects from being charged, avoiding a mistaken
conviction. Where it is used later in the process, it can exonerate
the wrongfully convicted. Yet, as one scholar has noted, “one less
appreciated aspect of increased DNA testing in the post-conviction
appeals context is that from a statistical standpoint, DNA testing
supports capital convictions far more often than it calls convictions
into question.” 131 The result is this “paradox”: DNA evidence has
reduced the number of parties wrongfully charged with or
convicted of a capital crime, but in the process it has reduced a
governor’s need to grant clemency to someone who can raise a
reasonable doubt about his guilt. 132
127. BANNER, supra note 15, at 303.
128. Id. at 303–04.
129. Id. at 304–05.
130. See Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 7 (“The most common reason for
governors’ commuting a sentence [from 1976 to 2013] from death to life
imprisonment relates to doubts about the inmate’s guilt.”).
131. Heise, Unequal Grace, supra note 2, at 965.
132. See id. (discussing this paradox of the Innocence Project’s “legacy”).
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The bottom line is this: the specter of executing an innocent
man, on which capital punishment opponents often rely, may be
just that: an illusion, not reality. At worst, the specter appears far
more often in academic journals than in real cases. To be sure, that
risk is always present, but whether it should lead to the abolition
of capital punishment hinges on the utilitarian judgment whether
the benefits of that penalty outweigh its costs. 133 That is a
macro-level judgment based on factors that are irrelevant to the
micro-level question of whether a particular person is innocent.
The two issues are distinct and must be answered separately. If
there is reason for Congress and state legislatures to believe that
capital punishment deters homicides that would not otherwise
have occurred—and recent scholarship argues that there is 134—
legislatures can legitimately and reasonably decide to prefer the
innocent lives that will be lost to homicide over the ones that would
be lost to the mistaken imposition of the death penalty. 135
133. See BANNER, supra note 15, at 304 (“The prospect of killing an innocent
person seemed to be the one thing that could cause people to rethink their support
for capital punishment.”).
134. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2748 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Justice Breyer speculates that it does not ‘seem likely’ that the death penalty
has a ‘significant’ deterrent effect. . . . It seems very likely to me, and there are
statistical studies that say so.”).
135. See Markman & Cassell, supra note 88, at 159–60 (“The minimal but
unavoidable risk of error in the administration of capital punishment must not
be allowed to induce a ‘failure of nerve’ that would paralyze society from taking
steps necessary to protect its citizens.”); Sunstein & Vermeule, Reply, supra note
91, at 856 (“In the United States, at least, no one is likely to execute innocent
people in order to produce greater deterrence.”).
I find the critics’ argument unpersuasive for another reason too, one that I can
only sketch here. They assume that American society has a greater interest in
preventing mistakes before or at trial than it actually has. In truth, the public—
and some Supreme Court justices for that matter—are quite hypocritical in their
attitude toward the operation of the criminal process.
Justice Hugo Black once wrote that “[t]here can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1965) (plurality opinion). But neither he nor the other
justices have ever taken that Olympian statement seriously. If the Court did, it
would cap the amount of money that people like Bill Gates or Warren Buffet could
spend at a trial were they ever charged with a crime or order the states to provide
to each defendant the same amount of money that those two people could spend.
Yet, we know that the public has never expressed sufficient outrage to force states
to choose either option. See, e.g., Dominick Dunne, The Verdict, VANITY FAIR (Mar.
1992), http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/1992/03/dunne199203 (last visited
Sept. 9, 2016) (discussing the William Kennedy Smith rape trial) (on file with the
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IV. Capital Punishment, Clemency, and Severity
Correcting an unjust sentence has been an historic rationale
for clemency. 136 Critics will maintain that clemency is necessary to
Washington and Lee Law Review).
Two other defense attorneys had preceded [Roy] Black on this case:
Herbert ‘Jack’ Miller of Washington, D.C., who had been Senator
Edward Kennedy’s lawyer in the Chappaquiddick affair in 1969 and
who was replaced after the prosecution likened his strategy to those he
had used at that time, and Mark Schnapp of Miami, who received a call
from Willie Smith two days after the incident and remained on the case
as part of the four-lawyer defense team after Black took over. Although
Black reportedly received only a quarter of a million dollars for his
services, a relatively low fee considering the family involved, he took
the case because of the international attention focused on it. However,
the total amount spent on Smith’s defense seemed, by comparison with
the money the prosecution spent, prodigious. Five private investigators
worked for months digging up information on the background of
Patricia Bowman, as well as of Anne Mercer and her boyfriend, Chuck
Desiderio, the two people Bowman telephoned to come to the Kennedy
compound on the night of the incident. In addition, a dozen or so expert
witnesses were called to cast doubt on Bowman’s story.
Id. It has been fifty years since Justice Black penned that remark in Griffin, and
the Court has done nothing of the kind since then, and it never will. It is one thing
to make such grandiose statements, another to mean them. A far better reflection
of the Court’s attitude toward the criminal process is its decision in McCleskey v.
Kemp. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). McCleskey challenged the constitutionality of the
death penalty on the ground that the evidence showed a material difference in
the likelihood of receiving the death penalty based on the race of the victim, with
juries far less likely to sentence a killer to death when the victim was black. See
id. at 286 (stating that McCleskey’s evidence “purport[ed] to show a disparity in
the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the race of the murder
victim”). The Court assumed that McCleskey’s statistics were correct but rejected
his argument for several reasons, one of them being that its effect, if true, would
call into question the operation of the entire criminal justice system. See id. at
314–15 (“McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”). It may
be cynical to say it, but the public is willing to be hypocritical about the operation
of the criminal justice system. As long as it believes that only other people can
wind up in its maw and as long as it does not see too many of the system’s warts
on television, the public is glad to let the criminal process operate with whatever
degree of accuracy the system’s professionals can produce. That certainly won’t
be the degree of accuracy that Judge Kozinski and other professionals expect the
criminal justice system to have, see, e.g., Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0,
44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii (2015) (“Although we pretend otherwise,
much of what we do in the law is guesswork.”), but they underestimate the
number of errors that most members of the public are willing to overlook (as long
as those individuals are not the ones mistakenly locked up).
136. Alexander Hamilton made this point in the Federalist Papers.
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ensure that the death penalty is an appropriate punishment in
capital cases. That argument, however, is unpersuasive. It is true
that Presidents and governors no longer grant clemency in capital
cases with the same frequency society witnessed for most of
American history. 137 It is also true that the reason why is, in part,
because of the fear that extending mercy to a killer will prove
politically costly. 138 But that is not the only or even the principal
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign
prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or
embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of
necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor
of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary
and cruel.
THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
The need has endured since then. As one commentator noted early in the
twentieth century,
The very nature of criminal law makes such a power vested somewhere
essential to relieve the vigor and cruelty of the law. The law must. In
theory, apply to all persons alike. It cannot take into consideration the
particular individual, nor the defects or injustices that frequently arise
in its consideration. Cases frequently arise to which no general rule
can apply without the gravest of injustic–es, and the most grievous
inhumanity, cases where had the legislature known of the particular
facts, and had been familiar with the general surroundings, it would
have relieved them of the general terms of the law, and the courts had
they the power, would have exempted them from the particular
statute.
Goodrich, supra note 1, at 336–37. The problem still exists today. See, e.g., United
States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004), aff’d, 433 F.3d 738 (10th
Cir. 2005); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 71 (2011); Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler,
Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Plan for Renewal,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2015); Jane L. Fryod, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level
Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1491
(2000) (“[T]he [Sentencing] Guidelines provide graduated, proportional increases
in sentence severity for additional misconduct or prior convictions, whereas
mandatory minimums sentences do not.”); cf. Brian Ledewitz & Scott Staples, The
Role of Executive Clemency in Modern Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 227, 234–
35 (1993) (arguing that executive clemency has been and should also be used if
an offender undergoes a fundamental character change in prison).
137. See BANNER, supra note 15, at 291 (“For centuries governors commuted
death sentences in significant numbers. That pattern continued for the first
two-thirds of the twentieth century. Florida commuted nearly a quarter of its
death sentences between 1924 and 1966. North Carolina commuted more than a
third between 1909 and 1954.”).
138. See id. (“Part of clemency’s decline was attributable to the growing
popularity and salience of the death penalty. . . . [M]any of the post-Gregg
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reason for the steep drop-off in the number of commuted death
sentences over the last forty years.
Beginning in the 1960s, the battle over capital punishment
shifted from the political arena to the courts. 139 Judges assumed
the responsibility that governors historically had performed to
ensure that a death sentence was imposed fairly. 140 The Supreme
Court has played the principal role in that transition. Since its
decision in Furman v. Georgia forty years ago, the Court has
rigorously scrutinized the capital sentencing process on the ground
that the death penalty is different in kind from any other
punishment. 141 In the process, the Court has developed a
considerable body of case law identifying the types of sentencing
schemes that do and do not satisfy constitutional requirements.
The Court has upheld sentencing schemes that use reasonably
defined aggravating circumstances to limit the class of
death-eligible defendants and allow a defendant to introduce
virtually any evidence that he considers mitigating. 142 By contrast,
the presence of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor—a
factor whose terms are so vague that the sentencing party has no
effective guidance to determine whether it is present 143—could

commutations were granted by governors who did not intend to seek reelection.”).
139. See id. at 231–66, 285–86 (discussing the Supreme Court’s role in the
death penalty process); MELTSNER, supra note 50, at 20 (same).
140. See BANNER, supra note 15, at 291–93 (“Judges, not governors, now
decided whether trials had been conducted fairly . . . .”).
141. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976) (stating that
“death is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than in
degree”).
142. For cases upholding capital sentences in those circumstances, see
generally Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504
(1995); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512
U.S. 1 (1994); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S.
370 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); California v. Brown,
479 U.S. 538 (1987); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
143. See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 235 (1992) (“A vague
aggravating factor employed for the purpose of determining whether a defendant
is eligible for the death penalty fails to channel the sentencer’s discretion.”);
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (holding that the aggravating
circumstance provision of Oklahoma’s death penalty statute was
unconstitutionally vague); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (same,
Georgia Supreme Court’s interpretation of Georgia statute ).
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require that a death sentence be set aside. 144 In addition, the Court
has found that restrictions on a defendant’s ability to introduce
most types of mitigating evidence deny him the opportunity to
argue in favor of a sentence less than death. 145
That is not all. Since its decision in Gregg, the Supreme Court
has ruled that certain categories of offenders cannot be executed
at all, regardless of the procedures used at sentencing. Those
categories consist of offenders who were minors at the time of the
crime; 146 who are mentally retarded or developmentally
144. Some capital sentencing laws require the jury to weigh aggravating
factors against mitigating factors. If an aggravating factor is unconstitutional,
the sentence must be set aside and the case remanded for resentencing. See, e.g.,
Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992) (reaffirming the principle of
setting aside sentences for unconstitutional aggravating factors); Sochor v.
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992) (same); Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232 (1992) (same);
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 319–321 (1991) (same); Clemons v. Mississippi,
494 U.S. 738, 752 (1990) (same). By contrast, other states use the existence of
aggravating factors only as a “bridge” that, once found, permits the jury to
consider the death penalty in light of all the evidence in the case. The existence
of an unconstitutional aggravating factor in a particular case does not
automatically require a death sentence to be set aside. See, e.g., Zant, 462 U.S. at
891 (1983) (holding that a death sentence was not constitutionally impaired by
an invalid statutory aggravating circumstance held found by the jury).
145. For cases vacating capital sentences in those circumstances, see
generally Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987);
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1
(1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95
(1979); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (concluding
that “the [Constitution] require[s] that the sentence . . . not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.”). But see Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 527
(2006) (ruling that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to introduce
evidence of an alibi that is inconsistent with the jury’s finding that he committed
the crime); cf. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173 n.6 (1988) (plurality
opinion) (doubting that a defendant can rely at capital sentencing on any
“residual doubt” that the jury might have as to his guilt for a non-death sentence);
id. at 187 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting that claim
outright).
146. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (ruling that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the execution of an offender who was
a juvenile at the time of the crime). Not every juvenile, however, would always
deserve some form of clemency. See CHARLES D. STIMSON & ANDREW M. GROSSMAN,
ADULT TIME FOR ADULT CRIMES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR JUVENILE KILLERS AND
VIOLENT TEENS 56 (2009) (“Used sparingly, as it is, life without parole is an
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disabled; 147 who did not themselves kill, attempt to kill, or intend
either that a killing take place or that lethal force would be
employed; 148 and who are mentally incompetent at the time of their
execution. 149 Those factors historically served as a basis for
executive clemency. Now, the Constitution has taken its place.
Moreover, since Gregg, even when the evidence is insufficient to
establish one of those exemptions as a matter of law, governors
have relied on that evidence as a basis for clemency. 150
The Court has also shown special solicitude for claims of error
in post-Gregg capital cases. For example, the Court has imposed
stricter, defense-friendly rules on the capital sentencing process
than those that apply to non-capital cases. 151 Finally, in its
self-assumed role as “Supreme Court of Capital Cases,” the Court
has reviewed the legality of sentences imposed in cases that did

effective and lawful sentence for the worst juvenile offenders. On the merits, it
has a place in our laws.”).
147. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (ruling that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the execution of a mentally retarded
offender); accord Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2273 (2015) (applying
Atkins).
148. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (adopting that rule).
149. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 418 (1986) (ruling that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the execution of an offender
incompetent at the time of his execution even if he was found competent to stand
trial and sane at the time of the crime); accord Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.
930, 959 (2007) (applying Ford).
150. See Gershowitz, supra note 51, at 12–16 (noting that governors relied on
an offender’s age, mental capacity, mental defect, and history of abuse as a child
to grant clemency).
151. Compare, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991), Chapman
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 466–67 (1991), and Ex parte United States, 242
U.S. 27, 37 (1916) (holding that Congress and the states may impose mandatory
sentences of imprisonment), with Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987),
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 638 (1977), and Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding that the states may not impose mandatory
capital sentences even if the defendant commits a particularly egregious crime or
is already serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole). Compare, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1949)
(holding that due process does not require disclosure to the defense of information
used to impose a death sentence), with Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362
(1977) (holding, post-Furman, that due process requires disclosure to the defense
of any information used to impose a death sentence; overruling Williams for
capital cases).
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not involve the type of broad, precedent-setting legal issues that
characterize nearly all of the Court’s noncapital decisions. 152
152. For examples of the Supreme Court acting in that role, see Weary v. Cain,
136 S. Ct. 1002, 1008 (2016) (engaging in a fact-specific application of the rule
adopted in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that the prosecution must
disclose exculpatory information to the defense); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct.
2269, 2273 (2015) (issuing a fact-specific decision applying the rule adopted in
Atkins that the state cannot execute a mentally retarded offender); Martinez v.
Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2010) (engaging in a fact-specific inquiry whether
offender could establish “cause” for failing to raise a claim earlier); Hinton v.
Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1090 (2014) (issuing a fact-specific ruling that the
capital defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel); Sears v. Upton, 561
U.S. 945, 957 (2010) (engaging in a fact-specific inquiry whether petitioner
suffered prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 684 (1984));
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 330 (2010) (engaging in a fact-specific
inquiry whether offender’s habeas petition was a “second” or “successive”
petition); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 (2009) (same); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S.
449, 476 (2009) (engaging in a fact-specific application of Brady); Panetti, 551
U.S. at 962 (applying the rule adopted in that the state cannot execute a
condemned prisoner who is mentally incompetent at the time of his execution);
Smith v. Texas (Smith II), 550 U.S. 297, 310 (2007), and Smith v. Texas (Smith
I), 543 U.S. 37, 52 (2004) (engaging in two fact-specific inquiries whether jury
instructions adequately allowed the jury to consider mitigating evidence); Brewer
v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007) (engaging in a fact-specific application
of the rule adopted in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), that a capital
defendant must be allowed to offer relevant mitigating evidence); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 240 (2007) (same); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374,
393 (2005) (issuing a fact-specific ruling that the capital defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel); Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 176 (2005)
(engaging in a fact-specific inquiry whether offender’s guilty plea was voluntary);
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005) (engaging in a fact-specific application
to the penalty phase of a capital case of the rule adopted in Holbrook v. Flynn,
475 U.S. 560 (1986), that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles
unless that use is justified by an essential state interest, such as the interest in
courtroom security); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 289 (2004) (issuing a factspecific ruling that a particular condemned prisoner was entitled to appeal the
denial of habeas relief to the circuit court of appeals, but without taking a position
on the merits of his claim); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 680 (2004) (engaging
in a fact-specific application of the rule adopted in Brady); Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 538 (2003) (issuing a fact-specific ruling that the capital defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36,
48 (2001) (engaging in a fact-specific application of the rule adopted in Simmons
v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), that a defendant in a capital case has the
right to inform the jury that, under the governing state law, he would not be
eligible for parole in the event that the jury sentences him to life imprisonment);
Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996) (engaging in a fact-specific
application of Brady); Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 12 (1995) (engaging in
a fact-specific application of the rule adopted in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68
(1985), that in some circumstances a capital defendant has a right to assistance
of a court-appointed psychiatrist); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 454 (1995)
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One consequence of the Supreme Court’s repeated
interventions is that the capital sentencing process is materially
different today than it was as recently as the middle of the
twentieth century. From the founding of the nation through that
point, the clemency process was the principal mechanism for
correcting errors at the guilt or sentencing stages of a capital case
and for ensuring that the death penalty was appropriate for an
individual offender. 153 Governors granted relief for trial errors that
appellate courts would today use as a basis for granting an offender
a new trial or sentencing hearing. Governors also used their
pardon power to tailor the punishment to the heinousness of the
crime or the incorrigibility of the offender. 154 For example,
governors would grant an offender clemency if he was young, an
inexperienced criminal, unlikely to reoffend, or the product of a
criminogenic environment. 155 Today, by contrast, the defendant
(engaging in a fact-specific application of Brady); Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S.
1079, 1081 (1992) (engaging in a fact-specific application of the rule in Clemons
v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), that a sentencer may not weigh an invalid
aggravating factor); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992) (engaging in a
fact-specific application of Clemons); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)
(engaging in a fact-specific application of the rule adopted in Harper v.
Washington, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), that the Due Process Clause establishes
requirements before a capital defendant may be involuntarily medicated to enable
him to stand trial); Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562, 568 (1992) (engaging in a factspecific inquiry whether an offender preserved a claim under Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992) (issuing a factspecific answer to the question of whether the particular Supreme Court decisions
in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), or Clemons, amounted to a “new
rule” under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), that generally cannot be raised
in federal habeas corpus); Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 323 (1991) (engaging
in a fact-specific inquiry whether the trial judge adequately considered mitigating
evidence); Selvage v. Collins, 494 U.S. 108, 110 (1990) (engaging in a fact-specific
inquiry whether petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred); Truesdale v. Aiken,
480 U.S. 527, 527 (1987) (engaging in a fact-specific inquiry whether a capital
offender was able to offer relevant mitigating evidence at trial); Bowden v.
Francis, 470 U.S. 1079, 1079 (1985) (engaging in a fact-specific application of the
rule adopted in Ake).
153. See BANNER, supra note 15, at 56–58 (noting that clemency was the only
means available to correct errors that occurred at trial and also served to spare
“incidental” from hardened and “viscious[]” criminals).
154. See id. at 54–55 (“While every death sentence was the same, the
circumstances of every capital crime were different, and so were the life histories
of the condemned criminals. The power of clemency was understood as a means
by which the state could tailor the sentence to the individual case.”).
155. See id. at 57–58
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has the right to offer such mitigating evidence at sentencing to
avoid a death sentence, the jury has the responsibility to determine
whether an offender is eligible for the death penalty, the jury or
trial judge must decide whether that punishment is appropriate,
and state appellate courts review the conviction and sentence. 156
The result has been to leave a chief executive with little or no
reason to halt an execution. Local juries and judges have already
filtered out those offenders to whom governors would have
historically granted a commutation. By the time that a condemned
prisoner has run out of legal challenges to his sentence and applies
for clemency, the chances are virtually nil that the death penalty
is an unduly severe or inappropriate punishment for him:
“Clemency was once a regular part of the capital sentencing
process, but once the process was constitutionalized, clemency
Where the condemned person’s guilt was clear and his trial conducted
properly, youth or inexperience as a criminal might save him from
being hanged. This was a second function served by clemency, that of
classifying offenders according to what was often called their
‘character,’ which tended to be synonymous with the perceived
likelihood that they would commit more crimes in the future.
See also id. at 103 (“Youth and inexperience had long been common reasons to
grant clemency, especially when the condemned person had been under the sway
of an older, hardened offender, so the idea that a person could be influenced to
commit a crime by those around him was a familiar one.”).
156. See id. at 286 (“In the end the [Supreme] Court held that the states could
not restrict the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence—that the jury must be
allowed to consider any kind of evidence that might point against a death
sentence, not . . . the evidence relevant to one of the statutory mitigating
circumstances.” (footnote omitted)). The jury must make the findings necessary
to establish that a convicted defendant is eligible for the death penalty. See Hurst
v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016) (“The Sixth Amendment protects a
defendant’s right to an impartial jury. This right required Florida to base [the
defendant’s] death sentence on a jury’s verdict, not a judge’s factfinding.”); Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (“The right to trial by jury guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the
fact-finding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth
Amendment applies to both.”). Once the jury makes the necessary eligibility
findings, it or the trial judge can decide what sentence is appropriate for a
particular defendant. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624; see also Alleyne v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163 (2013) (“Our ruling today does not mean that any fact that
influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury.”); United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select
a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”).
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became a freak occurrence.” 157 As Professor Stuart Banner has
explained:
Part of clemency’s decline was attributable to the growing
popularity and salience of the death penalty. A commutation
could be political suicide for an elected official in the new
climate, and so many of the post-Gregg commutations were
granted by governors who did not intend to seek reelection. But
of course the death penalty had also been very popular in earlier
eras, when governors had nevertheless commuted death
sentences in large numbers. The difference after Gregg was that
the courts were now handling many of the kinds of cases that
had once been suitable for clemency instead. Judges, not
governors, now decided whether trials had been conducted
fairly, so when considering applications for clemency governors
tended to defer to the courts that resolved the defendant’s
constitutional claims. Such deference left a vacuum in cases
where the death penalty seemed too severe, or where the
defendant might have been innocent, because these were issues
courts normally did not consider. Where the sentence had been
affirmed as constitutional at all stages of judicial review,
however, the assumption within governors’ offices tended to be
that the sentence ought not to be disturbed, an assumption very
different from the one that had prevailed for the preceding
several centuries, when the executive branch was supposed to
exercise its independent judgment as to the propriety of an
execution. When the courts moved in, the governors moved
out. 158

Of course, a governor could always disagree with the judgment
of the local citizens and officials about the appropriateness of
executing a particular defendant, and there may be cases where it
is sensible to remove a specific prisoner from death row. The
argument, however, that chief executives should do so on a regular
basis is nothing more than a thinly veiled effort to persuade the
chief executive to nullify the capital sentencing laws in the
relevant jurisdiction under the disguise of exercising clemency.
One final point: Critics of the current use of executive
clemency argue that governors should be willing “to forgive the
unforgiveable.” 159 Yet, those critics and death penalty opponents
157. BANNER, supra note 15, at 291.
158. Id. at 291–92.
159. Molly Clayton, Note, Forgiving the Unforgivable: Reinvigorating the Use
of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 54 B.C. L. REV. 751 (2013).
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generally do not discuss the facts of the cases that take offenders
to death row. Some condemned prisoners committed multiple
murders. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—one of the “Boston Marathon
Bombers”—murdered three people, maimed seventeen, and
injured more than 200. 160 Jerry William Correll murdered four
people, including his five-year-old daughter. 161 Joseph Edward
Duncan also murdered four people, one of whom was only thirteen
years old, another only eight. 162 Dustin Lee Honken murdered five
people, including two girls, one age ten and the other age six, who
were shot in the back of the head. 163 Lawrence Sigmond Bittaker
and Roy Norris, known as the “Toolbox Killers,” kidnapped and
murdered five teenage girls. 164 Erwin Charles Simants murdered
six people, one of whom was a five-year-old, another was a
seven-year-old, and a third was a ten-year-old. 165 William George
Bonin, dubbed the “Freeway Killer” in California, received the
death penalty for each of the (at least) ten murders he
160. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2015); Judgment for United
States v. Tsarnaev, No. 1:13-cr-10200-GAO-1 (D. Mass. June 24, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/file/643096/download; Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice & U.S. Attorney’s Office, Judge Imposes Death Sentence for Boston
Marathon Bomber (June 24, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/judgeimposes-death-sentence-boston-marathon-bomber.
161. Correll v. State, 523 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla. 1988).
162. United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 2011).
163. United States v. Honken, 541 F.3d 1146, 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2008). The
Court described the facts:
In 1993, after being indicted on federal drug trafficking charges,
Dustin Lee Honken (Honken) and his girlfriend, Angela Johnson
(Johnson), kidnapped and murdered a federal witness, the witness’s
girlfriend, and the girlfriend’s two young daughters. Honken and
Johnson murdered another potential federal witness three months
later. . . . . Using the maps Johnson drew, officers discovered the bodies
of Nicholson and the Duncan family, buried in a single hole located in
a wooded area outside Mason City. Kandi and Amber each had a single
bullet hole in the back of their heads. Nicholson and Duncan were
bound, gagged, and shot multiple times, including once in the head.
DeGeus’s body was found in a field a few miles away, face down in a
shallow hole. DeGeus had been shot one or more times, and his skull
was severely fragmented, requiring significant reconstruction.
Id.
164. People v. Bittaker, 774 P.2d 659, 664 (Cal. 1989), as modified on denial
of reh'g (Aug. 24, 1989). Only Bittaker received the death penalty. Id. at 1062.
165. State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881, 885 (Neb. 1977).
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committed. 166 George Banks murdered a dozen people. 167 Randy
Stephen Kraft, nicknamed, the “Freeway Killer” or the “Scorecard
Killer,” murdered at least sixteen young men. 168 John Wayne Gacy
was sentenced to death for twelve murders even though he had
murdered at least thirty-three young men. 169 Finally, as noted
earlier, Timothy McVeigh killed 168 people and wounded more

166. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 1995). The court described
the facts as follows:
Between 1979 and 1980, Bonin committed a string of shockingly brutal
murders in Southern California. As a result of his activities, Bonin
became known as the “Freeway Killer.” Although the details of each
murder vary and need not be repeated here, they shared a number of
common features. In general, Bonin would pick up boys between the
ages of 12 and 19 years. After engaging in various forms of homosexual
activity with the boys, Bonin would murder them. The victims were
usually killed by strangulation. The bodies of the victims exhibited
signs that they had been beaten around the face and elsewhere,
including the genital area. Marks were found on the wrists and ankles
of the victims, indicating that they had been tied. Several of the bodies
exhibited other more gruesome injuries. When Bonin was through with
the boys, he would then dump their nude bodies along Southern
California freeways.
Id. at 821; see also id. at 829 (describing Bonin’s earlier crimes).
167. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004).
168. People v. Kraft, 5 P.3d 68, 81 (Cal. 2000).
169. Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1993).
John Wayne Gacy is a serial killer. Between 1972 and 1978 he enticed
many young men to his home near Chicago for homosexual liaisons. At
least 33 never left. Gacy tied up or handcuffed his partners, then
strangled or choked them. Twenty-eight of the bodies were dumped
into the crawl space under the Gacy residence; one was entombed
under the driveway; the rest were thrown into the Des Plaines River.
Gacy, who operated a construction business, had his workers dig
trenches and throw lime into the crawl space. Gacy’s wife complained
about an “awful stench.” But the slaughter continued until the
disappearance of 15-year-old Robert Piest on December 11, 1978. Piest
vanished after telling his mother that he was going to see a building
contractor about a summer job. The presence of Gacy’s truck outside
the place where Piest was to meet his potential employer led to Gacy’s
arrest within two days.
Id. Gacy received only 12 death sentences because the state could only prove
that he had committed those murders after the Illinois capital sentencing
statute had gone into effect. Id.
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than 680 when he destroyed a federal building. 170 Other cases
could also be cited, but that would be just gilding the lily. 171
Other murderers acted not in the heat of passion, but rather
under circumstances manifesting either the intent to make the
victims suffer or total indifference toward their agony. For
example, as the Supreme Court summarized it in Glossip v. Gross,
here is how Benjamin Cole murdered his nine-month-old daughter
and how he reacted to her death: “Cole murdered his 9-month-old
daughter after she would not stop crying. Cole bent her body
backwards until he snapped her spine in half. After the child died,
Cole played video games.” 172 Next, consider the facts in
McCorquodale v. State, 173 a case involving Timothy McCorquodale
and another culprit named Leroy, a case that the Supreme Court
once described as “a horrifying torture-murder”: 174
The appellant, after telling Donna how pretty she was, raised
his fist and hit her across the face. When she stood up, he
grabbed her by her blouse, ripping it off. He then proceeded to
remove her bra and tied her hands behind her back with a nylon
stocking. McCorquodale then removed his belt, which was
fastened with a rather large buckle, and repeatedly struck
Donna across the back with the buckle end of the belt. He then
took off all her clothing and then bound her mouth with tape
and a washcloth. Leroy then kicked Donna and she fell to the
170. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999).
171. For other cases of multiple murders drawn from decisions by the
Supreme Court decisions and a few state courts, see infra Appendix B.
172. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2735 (2015) (quoting Cole v. State, 164
P.3d 1089, 1092–93 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007)); see also Cole v. State, 164 P.3d 1089,
1092 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).
Appellant’s nine-month-old daughter, Brianna Cole, was murdered on
December 20, 2002. According to the State Medical Examiner,
Brianna’s spine had been snapped in half, and her aorta had been
completely torn through due to non-accidental stretching. The official
cause of death was described as a fracture of the spine with aortic
laceration. . . . Appellant eventually admitted causing the fatal
injuries. In a statement he gave to police, Appellant said he’d been
trying, unsuccessfully, to get the child, who was lying on her stomach,
to stop crying. Appellant eventually grabbed his daughter by the
ankles and pushed her legs toward her head until she flipped over. This
action broke the child’s back and resulted in fatal injuries.
Id.
173. 211 S.E.2d 577 (Ga. 1974).
174. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976).
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floor. McCorquodale took his cigarette and burned the victim on
the breasts, the thigh, and the navel. He then bit one of Donna’s
nipples and she began to bleed. He asked for a razor blade and
then sliced the other nipple. He then called for a box of salt and
poured it into the wounds he had made on her breasts. At this
point Linda, who was eight months pregnant, became ill and
went into the bedroom and closed the door. McCorquodale then
lit a candle and proceeded to drip hot wax over Donna’s body.
He held the candle about 1/2 inch from Donna’s vagina and
dripped the hot wax into this part of her body. He then used a
pair of surgical scissors to cut around the victim’s clitoris.
While bleeding from her nose and vagina, Leroy forced the
victim to perform oral sex on him while McCorquodale had
intercourse with her. Then Leroy had intercourse with the
victim while McCorquodale forced his penis into the victim’s
mouth. McCorquodale then found a hard plastic bottle which
was about 5 inches in height and placed an antiseptic solution
within it, forcing this bottle into Donna's vagina and squirted
the solution into her. The victim was then permitted to go to the
bathroom to ‘get cleaned up.’ While she was in the bathroom,
McCorquodale secured a piece of nylon rope and told Bonnie and
her roommate that he was going ‘to kill the girl.’ He hid in a
closet across the hall from the bathroom and when Donna came
out of the bathroom he wrapped the nylon cord around her neck.
Donna screamed, ‘My God, you’re killing me.’ As McCorquodale
tried to strangle her, the cord cut into his hands and Donna fell
to the floor. He fell on top of her and began to strangle her with
his bare hands. He removed his hands and the victim began to
have convulsions. He again strangled her and then pulled her
head up and forward to break her neck. He covered her lifeless
body with a sheet and departed the apartment to search for a
means of transporting her body from the scene. 175

Consider Lisa Ann Coleman’s murder of nine-year-old
Davontae Williams: 176
This case arises out of the death of nine-year-old Davontae
Williams. On the morning of July 26, 2004, emergency services
were summoned to Davontae’s home upon report of his
“breathing difficulty.” Paramedic Troy Brooks arrived at the
residence only minutes later to find Davontae “obviously dead,”
inferring that Davontae had passed away several hours earlier.
Davontae, Brooks testified, was clad only in bandages and a
diaper, so “emaciated and underweight” that it was “shocking.”
175.
176.

McCorquodale, 211 S.E. at 579–80.
Coleman v. Thaler, 716 F.3d 895 (5th Cir. 2013).
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Brooks and another paramedic each believed that nine-year-old
Davontae weighed only twenty-five pounds.
Crime Scene Investigator Regina Taylor testified that Davontae
had “numerous injuries throughout . . . his entire body,”
including a disfigured ear, swollen hands, a slit in his lip, and
“ligature marks around his wrists and ankles.” Pediatrician
Nancy Kellogg identified over 250 wounds on his corpse. Dr.
Konzelmann testified that injuries to Davontae’s hands, arms,
and ankles were consistent with his having been bound
repeatedly. Konzelmann initially believed that Davontae had
“life-threatening blunt-force injuries, perhaps bleeding on the
brain, broken bones, et cetera” that caused his death.
Ultimately, however, Dr. Konzelmann deemed the cause of
Davontae’s death to be malnutrition with pneumonia. Dr.
Peerwani, Chief Medical Examiner for Tarrant County, further
testified that Davontae’s pneumonia resulted from his
malnutrition. And although Davontae was born prematurely,
Dr. Kellogg explained that Davontae previously had “a normal
growth velocity;” a metabolic disease, she inferred, was not
responsible for his malnutrition. According to the State of
Texas, however, Lisa Coleman was. 177

Or the facts in the case of Williams Andrews: 178
“[Dale Pierre,] Andrews, and [Keith] Roberts were airmen
stationed at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. Stanley Walker,
Michelle Ansley, Carol Naisbitt, Cortney Naisbitt (son of Carol
Naisbitt), and Orren W. Walker, Jr. (father of Stanley Walker)
were tied up, made to lie on the floor, and forced to drink liquid
Drano on the evening of April 22, 1974, in the basement of the
Hi-Fi Shop in Ogden, Utah, by [Pierre] in company with
Andrews, who aided [Pierre] by pouring the caustic substance
into a plastic cup for accomplishment of these violent acts.
[Pierre] and Andrews both had hand guns and [Pierre] finally
shot all of the victims in the head with either a .25 caliber or .38
caliber handgun, which caused the deaths, within a brief period
of time during that April evening, of Stanley Walker, Michelle
Ansley (who had also been raped by [Pierre] just before he shot
her) and Carol Naisbitt.

****

177.
178.

Id. at 898.
Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1986).
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“[A]fter shooting [Orren Walker, Pierre] vehemently kicked a
ball point pen into one of his ears and attempted to strangle him
with a cord.” 179

Then, there are the facts of Weisheit v. State: 180
Early in the morning of April 10, 2010, the German Township
Fire Department arrived at Weisheit’s Evansville, Indiana
home, which was engulfed in flames. After the fire was
extinguished, investigators found the bodies of eight-year-old
Alyssa Lynch and five-year-old Caleb Lynch. The children and
their pregnant mother Lisa Lynch, Weisheit’s girlfriend, had
been living with Weisheit since 2008. On the night of the fire,
Weisheit was home with the children while Lisa worked.
Alyssa was found in a closet, where she had either been trapped
inside or attempted to flee the fire. Over ninety percent of her
body was charred black, and a pathologist thought it possible
that she burned while she was still alive or as she asphyxiated
to death from soot and smoke inhalation. She likely experienced
a sensation similar to drowning in her final moments.
Also charred beyond recognition, Caleb was found on his
mattress,
hog-tied
with
duct
tape
and
with
a
twelve-inch-by-twelve-inch washcloth stuffed in his mouth and
secured by duct tape. A railroad flare had been placed in his
underwear, and another railroad flare was found under his
body. The flare in his underwear burnt his left thigh while he
was still alive and conscious. He died in agony of suffocation
from soot and smoke inhalation. 181
****
In an act of extreme heinousness, Weisheit set fire to a house
that he knew contained eight-year-old Alyssa Lynch and
five-year-old Caleb Lynch. His innocent victims, one of whom he
hog-tied with duct tape and gagged, spent the last moments of
their young lives in torturous pain. Lisa Lynch trusted Weisheit
to care for her children, and at his hands they suffered
agonizing deaths. That Weisheit had been planning to murder
the children and flee the state is evident from the fact that, on
the day before the fire, he quit his job and withdrew all of the
money in his bank account, and that on the night of the fire he
packed the money along with his clothes and toiletries into his
179. Id. at 1258–59 (quoting State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1343–44 (Utah
1977)).
180. 26 N.E.3d 3 (Ind. 2015).
181. Id. at 6–8.
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car before starting the deadly fire. And all because he
apparently believed Lisa may have been unfaithful. 182

Let’s finish with the facts of the crimes committed by two
brothers, Reginald and Jonathan Carr. The Supreme Court
described their crimes in Kansas v. Carr: 183
In December 2000, brothers Reginald and Jonathan Carr set
out on a crime spree culminating in the Wichita Massacre. On
the night of December 7, Reginald Carr and an unknown man
carjacked Andrew Schreiber, held a gun to his head, and forced
him to make cash withdrawals at various ATMs.
On the night of December 11, the brothers followed Linda Ann
Walenta, a cellist for the Wichita symphony, home from
orchestra practice. One of them approached her vehicle and said
he needed help. When she rolled down her window, he pointed
a gun at her head. When she shifted into reverse to escape, he
shot her three times, ran back to his brother’s car, and fled the
scene. One of the gunshots severed Walenta’s spine, and she
died one month later as a result of her injuries.
On the night of December 14, the brothers burst into a triplex
at 12727 Birchwood, where roommates Jason, Brad, and Aaron
lived. Jason’s girlfriend, Holly, and Heather, a friend of Aaron’s,
were also in the house. Armed with handguns and a golf club,
the brothers forced all five into Jason's bedroom. They
demanded that they strip naked and later ordered them into the
bedroom closet. They took Holly and Heather from the bedroom,
demanded that they perform oral sex and digitally penetrate
each other as the Carrs looked on and barked orders. They
forced each of the men to have sex with Holly and then with
Heather. They yelled that the men would be shot if they could
not have sex with the women, so Holly—fearing for Jason’s
life—performed oral sex on him in the closet before he was
ordered out by the brothers.
Jonathan then snatched Holly from the closet. He ordered that
she digitally penetrate herself. He set his gun between her
knees on the floor. And he raped her. Then he raped Heather.
Reginald took Brad, Jason, Holly, and Aaron one-by-one to
various ATMs to withdraw cash. When the victims returned to
the house, their torture continued. Holly urinated in the closet
because of fright. Jonathan found an engagement ring hidden
in the bedroom that Jason was keeping as a surprise for Holly.
182.
183.

Id. at 19.
136 S. Ct. 633 (2016).
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Pointing his gun at Jason, he had Jason identify the ring while
Holly was sitting nearby in the closet. Then Reginald took Holly
from the closet, said he was not going to shoot her yet, and raped
her on the dining-room floor strewn with boxes of Christmas
decorations. He forced her to turn around, ejaculated into her
mouth, and forced her to swallow. In a nearby bathroom,
Jonathan again raped Heather and then again raped Holly.
At 2 a.m.—three hours after the mayhem began—the brothers
decided it was time to leave the house. They attempted to put
all five victims in the trunk of Aaron’s Honda Civic. Finding
that they would not all fit, they jammed the three young men
into the trunk. They directed Heather to the front of the car and
Holly to Jason’s pickup truck, driven by Reginald. Once the
vehicles arrived at a snow-covered field, they instructed Jason
and Brad, still naked, and Aaron to kneel in the snow. Holly
cried, “Oh, my God, they’re going to shoot us.” Holly and
Heather were then ordered to kneel in the snow. Holly went to
Jason’s side; Heather, to Aaron.
Holly heard the first shot, heard Aaron plead with the brothers
not to shoot, heard the second shot, heard the screams, heard
the third shot, and the fourth. She felt the blow of the fifth shot
to her head, but remained kneeling. They kicked her so she
would fall face-first into the snow and ran her over in the pickup
truck. But she survived, because a hair clip she had fastened to
her hair that night deflected the bullet. She went to Jason, took
off her sweater, the only scrap of clothing the brothers had let
her wear, and tied it around his head to stop the bleeding from
his eye. She rushed to Brad, then Aaron, and then Heather.
Spotting a house with white Christmas lights in the distance,
Holly started running toward it for help—naked, skull
shattered, and without shoes, through the snow and over
barbed-wire fences. Each time a car passed on the nearby road,
she feared it was the brothers returning and camouflaged
herself by lying down in the snow. She made it to the house,
rang the doorbell, knocked. A man opened the door, and she
relayed as quickly as she could the events of the night to him,
and minutes later to a 911 dispatcher, fearing that she would
not live.
Holly lived, and retold this play-by-play of the night’s events to
the jury. Investigators also testified that the brothers returned
to the Birchwood house after leaving the five friends for dead,
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where they ransacked the place for valuables and (for good
measure) beat Holly's dog, Nikki, to death with a golf club. 184

Sadly, those cases do not stand alone. 185 The point is not
simply that some people can do horrible, detestable, sickening
things to others—they certainly can and have throughout history;
everyone would concede as much. Rather, the point here is that a
reasonable person could readily decide that some offenders do not
deserve even to be considered for clemency. It would be difficult to
blame governors for reaching the same conclusion.
V. Conclusion
For most of our history, governors granted condemned
prisoners clemency with some degree of regularity based on factors
such as the youth of the offender at the time of the crime, the
presence of a mental disease or defect, and the lesser sentence
received by a confederate for the same crime. Since the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment in Gregg
in 1976, however, governors have granted clemency only
infrequently. Critics, particularly steadfast opponents of capital
punishment, have sought to explain that turnabout on the ground
that, over the last forty years, governors have abandoned their
duty to exercise mercy in appropriate cases.
That criticism is mistaken. The best explanation for the
decline in clemency grants is that the legal environment
surrounding capital punishment today is wholly unlike the one
that predated Gregg. Today, the capital sentencing process no
longer leaves the decision whether a murderer should live or die to
the unguided discretion of a jury or judge, who may not have heard
relevant mitigating evidence. A defendant may offer the same
mitigating evidence to a jury or judge at sentencing that, in years
past, he would have submitted to the governor in clemency
proceedings. Atop that, the Supreme Court has placed out of
184. Id. at 638–39.
185. For other cases drawn from decisions by the Supreme Court and a few
state courts of offenders who intended to make the victim(s) suffer or who were
indifferent toward that suffering, see infra Appendix C (listing cases with
defendants that completely disregarded the harm and pain that they inflicted on
their victims).
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bounds the execution of certain categories of offenders—the young,
the mentally disabled, the less culpable—who would have been the
most likely candidates to receive clemency under the now obsolete
pre-Gregg capital sentencing processes, leaving only those
offenders most deserving of death. Clemency’s critics should
recognize that the success of capital punishment’s opponents in
limiting the pool of clemency applicants is the likely explanation
for the decline in clemency grants.
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Appendix A
Examples of Cases in Which a Murderer Was Paroled or Escaped
from Prison and Committed Another Murder
Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 1991). While
serving a sentence of life imprisonment for murder, Greenawalt
escaped with Gary Tison and murdered a family of four, which
included a two-year-old, with repeated shotgun blasts. See Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 139–41 (1987) (describing Tison’s
involvement with the prison escape and murders).
Kennedy v. Dugger, 933 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1991). While serving a
sentence of imprisonment for murder, Kennedy escaped and later
murdered a highway patrol officer. Id. at 907–08
Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2014). After being
released on parole from a second-degree murder conviction, Bomar
murdered a college student. Id. at 1185.
Dillbeck v. State, 964 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2007). Dillbeck was sentenced
to life imprisonment for murdering a police officer, but he escaped
and murdered a woman by repeatedly stabbing her. Id. at 97.
People v. McRae, No. 217052, 2001 WL 788481 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan.
12, 2001) vac. by 634 N.W.2d 361 (Mich. 2001). McRae appealed
from his conviction for his 1987 murder involving acts similar to
his 1950 murder conviction. Id. at *2. McRae’s 1950 conviction had
been reversed on procedural grounds. 678 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Mich.
2004).
Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1996). Ferrell, who was
sentenced to death for shooting his girlfriend, had a prior
second-degree murder conviction for shooting an earlier girlfriend.
Id. at 391.
Geary v. State, 930 P.2d 719 (Nev. 1996), modified on other grounds
on reh'g, 952 P.2d 431 (1998). While on parole from a 20-year-old
murder conviction, Geary murdered his roommate. Id. at 721–22.
Parker v. State, 456 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1984). Parker was sentenced
to life imprisonment for murder in 1967. He was later released and
committed another murder in Florida, one month before he
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committed a third murder, this time in Washington, D.C. Id. at
440.
King v. State, 436 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1983). Previously convicted of “the
axe-slaying of his common-law wife,” King was sentenced to death
for murdering a woman with a blunt object to the head. Id. at 55.
Appendix B
Examples of Capital Cases Involving Offenders Who Committed
Multiple Murders or Attempted Murders (Some cases could also be
placed in Appendix C)
White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456, 458 (2015) (two people murdered,
one of whom was pregnant).
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2193 (2015) (three people
murdered).
Bobby v. Mitts, 563 U.S. 395, 395 (2011) (two people murdered).
Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 142 (2010) (three people murdered
and two attempted murders).
Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2007) (two people murdered,
each victim was a woman who also was robbed and raped).
Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 519 (2006) (two people murdered).
Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 214 (2006) (one murder, one
attempted murder).
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 276 (2004) (two people
murdered).
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689 (2002) (two people murdered).
Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 91 (1998) (two people murdered).
Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 271 (1998) (four people
murdered).
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 751 (1996) (two people
murdered).
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 3 (1994) (two people murdered).
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Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1993) (at least twenty-six
people murdered).
Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 272 (1993) (two people murdered).
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 394 (1993) (two people murdered).
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 112 (1991) (two people murdered).
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151–52 (1990) (two people
murdered, three others wounded).
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 139–41 (1987) (four people
murdered, one was a two-year-old, another was 15).
Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 148–49 (1986) (two people
murdered).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (three people
murdered, along with torture, kidnapping, assaults, attempted
murder, attempted extortion, and theft).
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 40 n.1 (1984) (two people murdered).
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 994–95 (1983) (one murder, one
attempted homicide).
Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1287 (10th Cir. 1989) (four
people murdered).
Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 1986) (two people
murdered).
Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1984) (two people
murdered and two attempted murders).
State v. Wells, 864 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Idaho 1993) (two people
murdered).
Baze v. Com., 965 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Ky. 1997) (two people
murdered).
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Appendix C
Examples of Capital Cases Involving Offenders Who Intended to
Make the Victim(s) Suffer or Who Were Indifferent Toward that
Suffering (Some cases could also be placed in Appendix B)
Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006). Respondent unexpectedly
encountered the nineteen-year-old victim while burglarizing a
home and struck her in the head fifteen to twenty times with a
steel dumbbell. Id. at 11
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006). Respondent broke into the
home of Marry Ane Pusch and waited for her to return. Id. at 166.
Upon arrival, he shot her, stabbed her, and slit her throat.
Respondent then set the house on fire, burning Pusch’s toddler
alive. Id.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Petitioner was convicted
by a jury for two counts of first-degree murder as well as one count
of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree. Id. at
811. A jury sentenced him to death for his murders and thirty years
for his assault. Id. The Court described the gruesome scene of the
crime:
The victims of Payne’s offenses were 28-year-old Charisse
Christopher, her 2-year-old daughter Lacie, and her 3-year-old
son Nicholas. . . . [I]nside the apartment, the police encountered
a horrifying scene. Blood covered the walls and floor throughout
the unit. Charisse and her children were lying on the floor in
the kitchen. Nicholas, despite several wounds inflicted by a
butcher knife that completely penetrated through his body from
front to back, was still breathing. Miraculously, he survived, but
not until after undergoing seven hours of surgery and a
transfusion of 1,700 cc's of blood—400 to 500 cc's more than his
estimated normal blood volume. Charisse and Lacie were dead.
Charisse’s body was found on the kitchen floor on her back, her
legs fully extended. She had sustained 42 direct knife wounds
and 42 defensive wounds on her arms and hands. The wounds
were caused by 41 separate thrusts of a butcher knife. None of
the 84 wounds inflicted by Payne were individually fatal;
rather, the cause of death was most likely bleeding from all of
the wounds.

Id. at 811–13.
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Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990). Petitioner and accomplice,
Charles Lane, tortured and murdered Frances Arwood, a woman
whom he thought had given drugs to his girlfriend’s children. Id.
at 229–30. The Court discussed the heinous nature of the attack,
explaining that,
For reasons that are not clear, petitioner and Lane struck
Arwood repeatedly with their fists and dragged her by the hair
into the bathroom. There they stripped the victim naked,
literally kicked her into the bathtub, and subjected her to
scalding, dunkings, and additional beatings. Petitioner left
Lane to guard the victim, and apparently to rape her, while
petitioner went to the kitchen to boil water to scald her.
Petitioner kicked Arwood in the chest, causing her head to
strike the tub or a windowsill and rendering her unconscious.
The pair then dragged Arwood into the living room, where they
continued to beat and kick her. Petitioner poured lighter fluid
on the unconscious victim, particularly her torso and genital
area, and set the lighter fluid afire. He told Lane that he had
done this to show “just how cruel he could be.”

Id. at 230.
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). After bragging to
his friends that he was going to rob a disabled hitchhiker who he
had driven by on the road, petitioner brought the man to his car
and demanded his money. Id. at 301. Dissatisfied with the amount
of money the hitchhiker possessed, petitioner pulled out his
revolver, pulled to the side of the road into a field, and searched
the man. Id. Petitioner forced the man to lie on the ground,
returned to his friends to tell them that he was going to shoot the
disabled man, then returned to the victim and shot him in his head.
Id. at 301–02.
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). The defendant was
convicted of murder, robbery, and assault with intent to kill. Id. at
170. He was sentenced to death for his gruesome crimes. Id. After
killing a man, the defendant then forced the first victim’s wife to
perform oral sex while on the floor next to her husband’s body. Id.
at 172. Defendant then shot a teenage boy who came into the store
to make sure everything was ok. Id. at 173.
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). The defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder for killing an eleven-year-old boy.
Id. at 414. The defendant and his accomplice previously discussed

THE DEMISE OF CAPITAL CLEMENCY

1355

killing a human while on hunting trips. Id. The boy suffocated from
being gagged and stuffed in a truck. Id. After the defendant and
his accomplice killed him, they performed various sexual and
violent acts on the body. Id.
Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983). Respondent kidnapped a
ten-year-old boy from a school bus stop in Florida. Id. at 79. He
sexually assaulted the boy and killed him. Id. Respondent then
kidnapped two more young boys, one of whom he killed in Virginia.
Id. During his sentencing for the Florida murder, respondent
described his crime in graphic detail and gloated that he was
extremely proud of his killing and would do it again if given the
chance. Id. at 79–80.
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion). The
four defendants in this case were members of a group called the
“BLACK LIBERATION ARMY.” Id. at 942. Their goal was to kill
white people indiscriminately and to start a revolution and racial
war. Id. The defendants randomly selected their white victim,
drove him to a dump, and repeatedly stabbed him. Id. After the
murder, they left a note on the body discussing their revolutionary
race war goals. Id. at 943.
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). The court convicted
petitioner of first-degree murder of his nine-year-old daughter and
seven-year-old son. Id. at 284. The court also found him guilty of
torturing his eleven-year-old son and abusing his five-year-old
daughter. Id. at 285. The trial judge described the crimes,
explaining that the “evidence and testimony showed premeditated
and continuous torture, brutality, sadism and unspeakable horrors
committed against all of the children over a period of time.” Id.
Boyle v. State, 154 So. 3d 171 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013). The jury
sentenced the defendant to death for killing a two-year-old girl. Id.
at 183. After defendant brought her to a hospital, doctors found
significant head trauma. Id. The doctor who conducted the autopsy
determined that the girl died as a result of brain swelling from
blunt-force trauma and that her brain swelled to such a degree
that part of it broke off and pushed into her spinal cord. Id. The
victims’ sister testified that the week before her sister’s death she
saw defendant hit the toddler against the car door and also throw
her against a wall the night before her death. Id. at 183–84.
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Gobble v. State, 104 So. 3d 920 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). Defendant
was convicted of murdering her baby. Id. at 935. The four-monthold boy died “as a result of blunt-force trauma to his head,” with
fractured skull, ribs, right arm, both wrists, “multiple bruises on
his face, head, neck, and chest and a tear in the inside his mouth
that was consistent with a bottle having been shoved into his
mouth.” Id.
Wilson v. State, 751 S.W.2d 734 (Ark. 1988). The defendant raped,
bound, and strangled his first victim with a telephone cord. Id. at
735. The next day, he then beat and raped a second victim on the
hood of her car in a parking lot. Id. His second victim survived, but
underwent life-threatening surgery to treat a blood clot in her
brain that resulted from the beating. Id.
People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1990). The victim was
raped, sodomized, and stabbed around twenty-eight times with a
folding knife. Id. at 969. The evidence revealed that it was the
killer’s intention to torture the victim before she died,
demonstrated by the shallow nature of the cuts around her neck.
Id. at 969–70.
State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363 (Conn. 2003). The defendant
bludgeoned his thirteen-year-old victim to death by repeated blows
to the head with a three-pound sledgehammer. Id. at 375.
Correll v. State, 523 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1988). Defendant was
sentenced to death for killing his ex-wife, his five-year-old
daughter, his ex-wife’s sister, and their mother. Id. at 564. Each
victim died from massive hemorrhaging, caused by multiple stab
wounds. Id.
State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702 (Mo. 2004). The defendant was
convicted of killing a mother and child. Id. at 710. The mother was
stabbed twenty-one times and had five slash wounds while the
two-year-old child was stabbed nine times and had twelve slash
wounds. Id.
Lockett v. State, 53 P.3d 418 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). Petitioner
was sentenced to death for his crimes of conspiracy, first-degree
burglary, assault with a dangerous weapon, forcible oral sodomy,
first-degree rape, kidnapping, robbery, as well as first-degree
murder. Id. at 421.
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Commonwealth v. Fahy, 516 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1986). The defendant
was sentenced to death for rape and murder of a twelve-year-old
girl.
State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 2000). The defendant was
sentenced to death for the rape and murder of an eight-year-old
girl. Id. at 201
State v. Davidson, No. E2013-00394-CCA-R3-DD, 2015 Tenn.
Crim. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2015).
Defendant gruesomely raped and killed two victims, C.C. and C.N.
The medical examiner described the heinous nature of the crimes:
C.N. had been bound at the ankles by a belt and a strip of fabric
and at the wrists with “something like a shoelace.” He had also
been blindfolded and gagged, and his head had been wrapped in
a sweatshirt. Based upon the location of unburned skin on his
body, she determined that he had been wrapped in “some sort
of comforter and placed face up” before being set on fire. C.N.
suffered three gunshot wounds. A contact gunshot wound to his
head severed his brain stem, causing “instantaneous death.” A
gunshot wound “between the back of the neck and the
shoulders” did not “cause any major damage.” Another gunshot
wound entered C.N.’s back and traveled “steeply upward” where
it caused severe damage to his spinal cord. Lacerations,
abrasions, and bruising in the area of C.N.’s anus indicated anal
penetration that occurred before his death. . . . C.C.’s body was
inside the trash can, and strips of fabric had been used to bind
her body into a fetal position. A small plastic bag had been tied
around her head, and then her body had been placed in five
different large garbage bags before being placed into the trash
can. She was nude from the waist down. The autopsy findings
indicated that C.C. died inside the trash can of a combination of
positional asphyxiation due to the position of her body,
suffocation due to the plastic bag on her face, and mechanical
asphyxiation due to being placed in the confined space of the
trash can with bedding. Blood and other fluids were smeared
around her abdomen and upper chest. She suffered
“excoriations”—“like a carpet burn”—to her lower back and
upper buttocks. C.C.’s anogenital region sustained “tremendous
damage.” She had tears to her vagina and rectum as well as
severe blunt force trauma to the area. Doctor Mileusnic-Polchan
explained,
[T]he whole area was just a blunt-force trauma which is
bruising, contusion, and abrasions, and lacerations. . . . The
depth of the injury was so grave that there’s no way that just a
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regular rape could—could inflict this. . . . [T]his is an object
coming in contact with the body to inflict the serious injury of
this kind. C.C. also suffered blunt force trauma to her head,
contusions on her shoulders, bruising on her arms, and a small
cut on her hand. She suffered a torn frenulum, which was likely
caused by something being forcefully put into her mouth. C.C.’s
blood was negative for drugs and alcohol.

Id. at *11–13.
Archuleta v. Galetka, 267 P.3d 232 (Utah 2011). The victim in this
case was kidnapped and driven to an isolated area. He was then
[B]ound . . . with tire chains and a bungee cord . . . .
[R]emoved . . . from the trunk and [defendants] attached
battery cables to his testicles and to the car battery in a failed
attempt to electrocute him. They inflicted severe blows to
[victim]'s head with a tire jack and tire iron. And they inserted
the tire iron into [victim]'s rectum, forcing it eighteen inches
into his body and puncturing his liver. . . . [Victim] was found
naked from the waist down, with a gag around his mouth and
the tire chains wrapped tightly around his neck.
Id. at 241, ¶ 4.

